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ASYMMETRY AS FAIRNESS: REVERSING A 
PEREMPTORY TREND 
ANNA ROBERTS
 
ABSTRACT 
A recent Ninth Circuit decision, prohibiting peremptory challenges on 
the basis of sexual orientation, reveals the continuing evolution of the 
Batson doctrine. Meanwhile, contrary judicial voices demand the 
abolition of the peremptory challenge. This Article uncovers two 
phenomena that militate against abolition of the peremptory challenge, 
and in favor of allowing Batson’s evolution. First, the justifications for 
abolition apply asymmetrically to prosecution and defense, suggesting that 
an asymmetrical approach is more apt. Second, the states historically 
adopted an asymmetrical approach—unequal allocation of peremptory 
challenges to prosecution and defense—and yet many state legislatures 
have recently abandoned asymmetry, with some legislators declaring that 
there are no reasons not to. This Article supplies those reasons, 
demonstrating that asymmetrical allocation of peremptory challenges not 
only brings benefits in the context of jury selection but also may help resist 
tendencies elsewhere in the criminal justice system to equate asymmetry 
with unfairness, and thus to erode foundational protections.   
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INTRODUCTION  
The doctrine of Batson v. Kentucky,
1
 created in 1986 and developed in 
numerous subsequent Supreme Court decisions,
2
 continues to evolve. In 
 
 
 1. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). 
 2. See, e.g., Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472 (2008); Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231 
(2005); Johnson v. California, 545 U.S. 162 (2005); Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765 (1995); J.E.B. v. 
Alabama, 511 U.S. 127 (1994); Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42 (1992); Edmonson v. Leesville 
Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614 (1991); Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352 (1991); Powers v. Ohio, 
499 U.S. 400 (1991). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol92/iss6/6
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January 2014, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals became the first circuit 
court to hold that the peremptory challenge, a trial tool with deep historical 
roots,
3
 cannot be exercised on the basis of sexual orientation,
4
 any more 
than it can on the basis of race,
5
 ethnicity,
6
 or gender.
7
 Yet running 
alongside this doctrinal development is a current of despair: a growing 
body of judges,
8
 as well as other commentators,
9
 who declare that the 
doctrine has proved a miserable failure, and that, despite its deep historical 
roots, the peremptory challenge must be abolished. 
Four rationales appear repeatedly in support of calls for abolition. First, 
that the peremptory challenge, which allows litigants to remove qualified 
potential jurors simply because they want them gone, is anti-democratic.
10
 
Second, that the Batson doctrine is difficult to police.
11
 Third, that the 
 
 
 3. See Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 639 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“The peremptory challenge is a 
practice of ancient origin, part of our common law heritage in criminal trials.”). 
 4. SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Abbott Labs., 740 F.3d 471, 484 (9th Cir. 2014).  
 5. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 89. 
 6. See Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 352 (using the words “race” and “ethnicity” interchangeably). 
 7. See J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 129 (extending prohibition on purposeful discrimination in 
peremptory challenges to challenges on the basis of gender). 
 8. For recent judicial recommendations of abolition, see, for example, Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 
U.S. 231, 267 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring); Rice v. Collins, 546 U.S. 333, 344 (2006) (Breyer & 
Souter, JJ., concurring); Williams v. Norris, No. 5:02 CV00450, 2007 WL 1100417, at *6–7 (E.D. 
Ark. Apr. 11, 2007) (quoting state trial judge) (“I think Batson is the most ridiculous concept that a 
Judge has ever had to work with. . . . The United States Supreme Court made a terrible mistake. They 
should have outlawed peremptory challenges, because this puts a burden on the judiciary that is 
untenable. . . . I think that we’d all be better off if we excused for cause and put twelve in the box.”); 
State v. Saintcalle, 309 P.3d 326, 348 (Wash. 2013) (González, J., concurring); Morgan v. 
Commonwealth, 189 S.W.3d 99, 116 (Ky. 2006) (Graves, J., concurring) (expressing the wish that the 
state would move one step closer to “the inevitable implosion of the current peremptory challenge 
system”), overruled by Shane v. Commonwealth, 243 S.W.3d 336 (Ky. 2007); Mark W. Bennett, 
Unraveling the Gordian Knot of Implicit Bias in Jury Selection: The Problems of Judge Dominated 
Voir Dire, the Failed Promise of Batson, and Proposed Solutions, 4 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 149, 150 
(2010) (describing the Batson process as “thoroughly inadequate”); John Paul Stevens, Foreword, 
Symposium: The Jury at a Crossroad: The American Experience, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 907, 907–08 
(2003) (“A citizen should not be denied the opportunity to serve as a juror unless an impartial judge 
can state an acceptable reason for the denial. A challenge for cause provides such a reason; a 
peremptory challenge does not.”). 
 9. See, e.g., Joshua C. Polster, From Proving Pretext to Proving Discrimination: The Real 
Lesson of Miller-El and Snyder, 81 MISS. L.J. 491, 528–29 (2012) (“Ruling on Batson challenges . . . 
courts have accepted that prospective jurors were struck for being too old or too young; too vocal or 
too passive; too educated or too uneducated; for being single or because of a marital relationship; and 
for being accused of a crime or having been a victim of a crime.”); Akhil Reed Amar, Reinventing 
Juries: Ten Suggested Reforms, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1169, 1182 (1995); Albert W. Alschuler, The 
Supreme Court and the Jury: Voir Dire, Peremptory Challenges, and the Review of Jury Verdicts, 56 
U. CHI. L. REV. 153, 199–211 (1989). 
 10. See infra Part I.C; see also Alschuler, supra note 9, at 156 (describing the peremptory 
challenge as “the most undemocratic feature of our democratic trial system”). 
 11. See infra Part I.C. 
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harms caused by peremptory challenges are severe.
12
 And fourth, that 
peremptory challenges serve few or no countervailing needs.
13
 The best 
that can be done in light of these concerns, the critics say, is to retire 
Batson, abolish the peremptory challenge, and perhaps focus instead on 
methods of finding and removing potential jurors who have some 
demonstrable bias.
14
 
This Article uncovers two phenomena that are critical to the discussion 
of the peremptory challenge in the criminal trial.
15
 Each of them militates 
against across-the-board abolition of the peremptory challenge and in 
favor of allowing and encouraging the further evolution of the Batson 
doctrine.  
First, the critiques used to justify the peremptory challenge’s abolition 
do not apply symmetrically to the prosecution and the defense. Threats to 
democracy and other harms are qualitatively different when caused by 
prosecutorial peremptory challenges than when caused by defense 
peremptory challenges;
16
 the need for the peremptory challenge is stronger 
on the part of the defense than on the part of the prosecution;
17
 and there is 
at least some indication of differential policing of the peremptory 
challenge that imposes a more effective restraint on the defense’s use of 
the peremptory challenge than on the prosecution’s.
18
 The relevant 
distinctions are downplayed or omitted by those judges who call for 
abolition—perhaps unsurprisingly, since some of these distinctions 
implicate troubling disparities in the criminal justice system over which 
they preside
19
—and an examination of them suggests that asymmetrical 
approaches are more appropriate than across-the-board abolition. 
Second, many jurisdictions have already attempted an asymmetrical 
approach to the peremptory challenge, but this approach is steadily being 
eroded in a quiet march toward symmetry. In the decade prior to Batson, 
twenty states had in place a structure that corresponded to the 
asymmetrical harms and benefits of peremptory challenges: they allocated 
fewer to the prosecution than to the defense.
20
 Since then, the quiet but 
 
 
 12. See infra Part I.C. 
 13. See infra Part I.C. 
 14. See infra note 67. 
 15. This Article leaves to one side the allocation of peremptory challenges to the parties in civil 
trials. 
 16. See infra Parts II.A, II.C. 
 17. See infra Part II.D. 
 18. See infra Part II.B. 
 19. See infra Part II.D. 
 20. See infra Part III.A.3. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol92/iss6/6
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steady trend has been toward symmetry: only nine states currently 
preserve asymmetry,
21
 and two of those regimes have been under recent 
legislative attack.
22
 Lying behind these developments, as with other 
developments in criminal procedure, seems to be the notion that with two 
evenly matched adversaries duking it out, fairness dictates equal tools on 
both sides.
23
 According to legislators and rules drafters considering this 
issue, there was no apparent reason why the two sides should not receive 
equal numbers of peremptory challenges.
24
 This Article provides those 
reasons, and recommends that asymmetry in the allocation of peremptory 
challenges—greater allocation of peremptory challenges to the defense 
than to the prosecution—be restored in those jurisdictions where it has 
been abandoned. 
Part I introduces the peremptory challenge, the Batson doctrine, and 
four of the most prominent justifications for doing away with them. Part II 
demonstrates that each of these justifications applies asymmetrically to 
prosecution and defense, thus militating in favor of asymmetrical 
approaches rather than across-the-board abolition. Part III uncovers one 
such asymmetrical approach, the asymmetrical allocation of peremptory 
challenges, and tracks its steady erosion. It proposes that this trend toward 
symmetry be acknowledged and reversed. Despite the surface appeal of 
equating symmetry with fairness, asymmetry is at the root of various 
structures in our criminal justice system designed to protect fairness.
25
 
Preserving asymmetry in the peremptory challenge context has promise, 
 
 
 21. See infra Part III.A.3. 
 22. See infra Part III.A.3. 
 23. See Morgan v. Commonwealth, 189 S.W.3d 99, 138 (Ky. 2006) (Cooper, J., dissenting) 
(describing the motivation for abandoning asymmetry in that state as a “gradual[] recogni[tion] that in 
criminal cases, as has always been true in civil cases, there should be a level playing field between 
prosecution and defense”), overruled by Shane v. Commonwealth, 243 S.W.3d 336 (Ky. 2007). 
 24. See Peremptory Challenges of Jurors: Hearing on S.B. 353 Before the H. Comm. on State 
Affairs, 1993–94 Leg., 18th Sess. (Alaska 1994) (committee minutes) (“Representative Ulmer inquired 
whether or not [a proposed bill designed to bring about symmetry] was similar to how the law was 
previously in the state of Alaska. She assumed at one point there had been an equal number and it was 
changed. If so, why was it changed and why is it being changed back. Chairman Vezey answered . . . 
[that] [t]he legal history of the change . . . went too far back for him to have knowledge of. . . . Margot 
Knuth, Assistant Attorney General, Department of Law, answered Representative Ulmer’s question. 
. . . [She] did not know why the discrepancy had existed for so many years.”); 1 DAVID P. CLUCHEY & 
MICHAEL D. SEITZINGER, MAINE CRIMINAL PRACTICE 24-6.1 (1995) (quoting Advisory Committee 
Note relating to 1991 Amendment to the Rules of Criminal Procedure, which stated that “[t]he 
Advisory Committee sees no reason to continue the practice of giving to a defendant in a murder case 
twice as many peremptory challenges as are given to the state”). 
 25. See People v. Hayes, 301 N.W.2d 828, 830 (Mich. 1981) (“[W]e disapprove the notion 
reflected in the ruling we now reverse that identical treatment of opposing parties in a criminal 
prosecution necessarily achieves a fair result. Symmetry is neither an object of criminal procedure nor 
a proper criterion of fairness.”). 
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not only as an approach to some of the problems with Batson, but also as a 
concrete form of resistance to quiet and troubling trends toward symmetry 
occurring elsewhere in the criminal justice system.  
I. PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES, BATSON, AND THE CRITIQUES THAT THEY 
INSPIRE  
A. Peremptory Challenges  
Peremptory challenges constitute the final stage of jury selection.
26
 Of 
the potential pool of citizens who might serve as jurors, some never 
receive summonses.
27
 Of those who present themselves at the courthouse, 
some are never called into a courtroom.
28
 Of those who reach a courtroom, 
some are found to lack the relevant statutory qualifications,
29
 some are 
excused because of the hardships that jury service would involve,
30
 and 
some are removed through the attorneys’ challenges “for cause,” which 
allow the removal of those jurors that the court deems unable to be fair.
31
 
Those who remain are subject to peremptory challenges, allocated to each 
side in a limited number.
32
 To exercise a peremptory challenge is merely 
to say “I do not want this person on the jury.”
33
 No further reason need be 
given, unless one’s adversary makes a Batson challenge,
34
 as described in 
the next subpart.  
 
 
 26. See Sandra Guerra Thompson, The Non-Discrimination Ideal of Hernandez v. Texas 
Confronts a “Culture” of Discrimination: The Amazing Story of Miller-El v. Texas, 25 CHICANO-
LATINO L. REV. 97, 104 (2005). 
 27. See Anna Roberts, (Re)forming the Jury: Detection and Disinfection of Implicit Juror Bias, 
44 CONN. L. REV. 827, 880–81 (2012). 
 28. See id. at 867. 
 29. See Anna Roberts, Casual Ostracism: Jury Exclusion on the Basis of Criminal Convictions, 
98 MINN. L. REV. 592, 596 (2013). 
 30. See Roberts, supra note 27, at 880. 
 31. See Eva Paterson et al., The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection in the 21st Century: Building 
upon Charles Lawrence’s Vision to Mount a Contemporary Challenge to the Intent Doctrine, 40 
CONN. L. REV. 1175, 1191 n.84 (2008) (citing Darbin v. Nourse, 664 F.2d 1109, 1113 (9th Cir. 1981)) 
(“The challenge for cause is narrowly confined to instances in which threats to impartiality are 
admitted or presumed from the relationships, pecuniary interests, or clear biases of a prospective 
juror.”). 
 32. See Roberts, supra note 29, at 601. 
 33. See Nieto v. State, 365 S.W.3d 673, 675 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (“The party exercising a 
peremptory strike typically does not have to explain its rationale for the strike, unless the strike is 
challenged under Batson.”). 
 34. See id.; Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol92/iss6/6
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B. Batson v. Kentucky  
The Supreme Court has set constitutional limits on the use of 
peremptory challenges. Batson v. Kentucky relied on the Equal Protection 
Clause to prohibit the use of peremptory challenges by the prosecution to 
effectuate purposeful discrimination against African-American jurors in 
criminal cases with African-American defendants.
35
 Subsequent Supreme 
Court case law has expanded the reach of the Batson doctrine, so that 
purposeful discrimination on the basis of race, ethnicity,
36
 or gender is 
prohibited,
37
 in both civil and criminal cases,
38
 regardless of which party is 
alleged to have engaged in it,
39
 regardless of the race of the juror,
40
 and 
regardless of the race of the parties.
41
 The Supreme Court may soon decide 
whether the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals was correct in finding that the 
doctrine should expand further, to include sexual orientation as a 
prohibited ground for exercising a peremptory challenge.
42
 
Batson laid out a three-step process for assessing a claim of purposeful 
discrimination, the basic structure of which is still in place.
43
 In Batson’s 
current form, the first step for an attorney who objects to a peremptory 
challenge is to establish a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination.
44
 
If the trial court finds that this step has been satisfied, the party who 
 
 
 35. Batson, 476 U.S. 79. 
 36. Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 355 (1991). 
 37. J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 129 (1994). 
 38. See Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 616 (1991) (private litigants in a 
civil case prohibited from basing peremptory challenges on race). 
 39. See Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 59 (1992) (prohibiting purposeful discrimination in 
peremptory challenges exercised by defense counsel). 
 40. The Supreme Court has never held that purposeful discrimination against white jurors 
violates the Equal Protection Clause, but courts have assumed this to be a necessary implication of the 
decisions that the Court has reached. See Maisa Jean Frank, Challenging Peremptories: Suggested 
Reforms to the Jury Selection Process Using Minnesota as a Case Study, 94 MINN. L. REV. 2075, 2092 
n.126 (2010) (“Although no U.S. Supreme Court precedent addresses this issue, some lower courts 
have extended Batson to the exclusion of white jurors.”); see also Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 409 
(1991) (“We hold that the Equal Protection Clause prohibits a prosecutor from using the State’s 
peremptory challenges to exclude otherwise qualified and unbiased persons from the petit jury solely 
by reason of their race . . . .”). 
 41. See Powers, 499 U.S. at 402. 
 42. See SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Abbott Labs., 740 F.3d 471, 484 (9th Cir. 2014). On June 
24, 2014, a sua sponte call for en banc review was rejected, with three judges dissenting. SmithKline 
Beecham Corp. v. Abbott Labs., 759 F.3d 999 (9th Cir. 2014). Prospects for further review remain 
uncertain. Id. at 994–95 (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting) (“While this case may end here—neither party is 
likely to seek certiorari given that neither party urged en banc reconsideration of the applicable 
standard of review—reliance on the panel’s analysis as an example of anything more than an exercise 
of raw judicial will would be most unwise.”). 
 43. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96–98 (1986). 
 44. Id. at 96. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
1510 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 92:1503 
 
 
 
 
exercised the peremptory challenge must then give a reason that is neutral 
as to the alleged basis for the peremptory challenge.
45
 Neutrality means 
little more than omitting mention of the prohibited basis.
46
 The court’s task 
at the third step is to assess whether the party objecting to the peremptory 
challenge has carried its burden of proving purposeful discrimination.
47
 
Batson declined to mandate “particular procedures” for courts to follow in 
their implementation of this three-step analysis.
48
 
C. Critiques of Peremptory Challenges and Batson  
A wide variety of judges,
49
 scholars,
50
 and other commentators have 
called for the abolition of the peremptory challenge.
51
 This subpart 
introduces four of their most prominent critiques. 
The first critique is that to remove citizens from the jury in the absence 
of the kind of demonstrated bias that would justify a challenge “for cause” 
is anti-democratic.
52
 The jury is idealized as a cross-section of the 
community,
53
 and the peremptory challenge permits a type of cherry 
picking (or at least cherry rejection) that seems in tension with that ideal.
54
  
 
 
 45. Id. at 97–98.  
 46. Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 360 (1991) (“A neutral explanation in the context of 
our analysis here means an explanation based on something other than the race of the juror. At this 
step of the inquiry, the issue is the facial validity of the prosecutor’s explanation. Unless a 
discriminatory intent is inherent in the prosecutor’s explanation, the reason offered will be deemed 
racial neutral.”). For a recent attempt to assert higher standards at Batson’s second step, see State v. 
Giles, 754 S.E.2d 261, 262 (S.C. 2014) (holding that defendant’s assertion that stricken Caucasian 
jurors were “not right for the jury” did not satisfy Step 2, even though it was “technically, semantically 
and intellectually race neutral”). 
 47. Batson, 476 U.S. at 98.  
 48. See id. at 99 n.24 (“In light of the variety of jury selection practices followed in our state and 
federal trial courts, we make no attempt to instruct these courts how best to implement our holding 
today.”). 
 49. See supra notes 10–14 and accompanying text. 
 50. See supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
 51. For a recent newspaper editorial calling for the abolition of the peremptory challenge, see 
Editorial, The Problem with Peremptory Challenges, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 20, 2013), http://articles. 
latimes.com/2013/sep/20/opinion/la-ed-peremptory-challenges-sexual-orientation-20130920, archived 
at http://perma.cc/2DQQ-5H3K. 
 52. See Amar, supra note 9, at 1182; see also Alschuler, supra note 9, at 156. 
 53. See Amar, supra note 9, at 1182 (“Democracy is well served if juries force together into 
common dialogue a fair cross section of citizens who might never deliberate together anywhere else.”). 
 54. See id. (“By and large, the first twelve persons picked by lottery should form the jury. The 
jury—and not just the venire—should be as cross-sectional of the entire community of the whole 
people as possible. Peremptory challenges should be eliminated: they allow repeat-player regulars—
prosecutors and defense attorneys—to manipulate demographics and chisel an unrepresentative panel 
out of a cross-sectional venire.”); Alschuler, supra note 9, at 232 (abandoning peremptory challenges 
would mean juries could be selected in a way that reflects “the breadth of our communities rather than 
the group left over when lawyers had expended their peremptory challenges on pet hates”); Albert W. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol92/iss6/6
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The second critique is that the Batson doctrine has proven inadequate 
to the task of policing purposeful discrimination in peremptory 
challenges.
55
 This critique takes numerous forms. The Batson test requires 
acts that its critics identify as very difficult: for the lawyer, asserting that a 
colleague at the bar has engaged in purposeful discrimination;
56
 for the 
judge, detecting and declaring purposeful discrimination.
57
 Despite the 
existence of Batson, statistical data indicate stark racial disparities in the 
use of peremptory challenges in numerous jurisdictions.
58
 Anecdotal data 
 
 
Alschuler, Implementing the Criminal Defendant’s Right to Trial, Alternatives to the Pleas Bargaining 
System, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 931, 1018–19 (1983) (asserting that the tendency in a system of peremptory 
challenges, where “opposing advocates attack the panel of prospective jurors from both ends,” is “to 
provide juries of clerks and to diminish our vision of the jury as a cross section of the community”); 
Kathryne M. Young, Outing Batson: How the Case of Gay Jurors Reveals the Shortcomings of 
Modern Voir Dire, 48 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 243, 265 (2011) (exclusion of unpopular groups “means 
that the jury will not accurately reflect the values of the people who comprise the jurisdiction”). 
 55. See, e.g., William T. Pizzi, Batson v. Kentucky: Curing the Disease but Killing the Patient, 
1987 SUP. CT. REV. 97, 134 (describing Batson as an “enforcement nightmare”); Brian J. Serr & Mark 
Maney, Racism, Peremptory Challenges, and the Democratic Jury: The Jurisprudence of a Delicate 
Balance, 79 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 59 (1988) (arguing that the Batson procedural hurdles 
have become “less obstacles to racial discrimination than they are road maps” to disguised 
discrimination); Jeffrey S. Brand, The Supreme Court, Equal Protection and Jury Selection: Denying 
that Race Still Matters, 1994 WIS. L. REV. 511, 583–96 (claiming that Batson fails to permit the 
identification or elimination of challenges based on race). 
 56. See EQUAL JUSTICE INITIATIVE, ILLEGAL RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN JURY SELECTION: A 
CONTINUING LEGACY 6 (2010), available at http://www.eji.org/files/EJI%20Race%20and%20Jury 
%20Report.pdf, archived at http://perma-cc/RU5G-KWC6 (“Many defense lawyers fail to adequately 
challenge racially discriminatory jury selection because they are uncomfortable, unwilling, 
unprepared, or not trained to assert claims of racial bias.”). 
 57. See United States v. Clemmons, 892 F.2d 1153, 1162 & n.10 (3d Cir. 1989) (“So long as 
peremptory challenges are permitted, trial and appellate judges will continue to have difficulty in 
ascertaining whether the prosecutor's motives in exercising peremptory challenges are good or bad.”); 
United States v. Thomas, 943 F. Supp. 693, 698 (E.D. Tex. 1996) (“The Constitution provides the 
defendant with a right to have a jury selected free from discriminatory selection procedures. 
Nevertheless, a violation of this right is extremely difficult to determine.”); People v. Bolling, 591 
N.E.2d 1136, 1142 (N.Y. 1992) (Bellacosa, J., concurring) (“The process that requires courts to sift 
through counsel’s words for patterns or pretexts of discrimination has not served the goal of cutting the 
discriminatory weeds out of the jury selection process.”); Sheri Lynn Johnson, Respectability, Race 
Neutrality, and Truth, 107 YALE L.J. 2619, 2657 (1998) (reviewing RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, 
CRIME, AND THE LAW (1997) (“[T]he purposeful discrimination standard forces a judge to choose 
between ignoring specious justifications . . . or calling a fellow member of the bar a liar and a 
racist.”)); Samuel R. Sommers & Michael I. Norton, Race-Based Judgments, Race-Neutral 
Justifications: Experimental Examination of Peremptory Use and the Batson Challenge Procedure, 31 
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 261, 263 (2007) (“[E]ven if attorneys consciously and strategically consider 
race during jury selection, they would be unlikely to admit it. Such an admission would have 
immediate consequences, as it would comprise a Batson violation. More generally, psychologists have 
noted that behavior is often influenced by the desire to appear nonprejudiced and to avoid the social 
sanctions that can follow from the appearance of racial bias.”). 
 58. See, e.g., State v. Saintcalle, 309 P.3d 326, 357 (Wa. 2013) (González, J., concurring) 
(“Racial disparities in peremptory usage have been documented in the courts of Alabama, Georgia, 
Illinois, Louisiana, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, and Texas.”); Robert P. Mosteller, Responding to 
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suggest that not just race but also ethnicity and gender frequently influence 
the use of peremptory challenges.
59
 Scrutiny of Batson decisions suggests 
that lawyers offer absurd pretexts for their discriminatory use of 
peremptory challenges and, in doing so, evade Batson’s protections.
60
 As 
one recent article summarized the situation,  
[r]uling on Batson challenges . . . courts have accepted that 
prospective jurors were struck for being too old or too young; too 
vocal or too passive; too educated or too uneducated; for being 
single or because of a marital relationship; and for having been 
accused of a crime or having been a victim of a crime.
61
  
Failures of trial courts adequately to police peremptory challenges are left 
undisturbed, thanks to the extreme deference shown to trial court Batson 
findings on appeal.
62
  
The third critique develops from the perceived failures of the Batson 
doctrine, and identifies as severe the harms brought about by the 
peremptory challenge, particularly where it is driven by purposeful 
discrimination.
63
  
The final critique alleges that there is no countervailing benefit to, or 
need for, the peremptory challenge.
64
 Those mounting this critique assert 
that the results of studies investigating the effectiveness of the peremptory 
challenge are unimpressive.
65
 They argue that challenges “for cause” 
 
 
McCleskey and Batson: The North Carolina Racial Justice Act Confronts Racial Peremptory 
Challenges in Death Cases, 10 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 103, 104 (2012) (“North Carolina data . . . shows 
that, within geographically defined prosecutorial units as well as at the state level, peremptory strikes 
have been made at a far higher rate against racial minorities than whites. The effects of race persist 
even after the study controls for a broad range of neutral justifications for those strikes.”). 
 59. See Mimi Samuel, Focus on Batson: Let the Cameras Roll, 74 BROOK. L. REV. 95, 95 (2008) 
(“[A] 2005 survey revealed that every lawyer interviewed considered race and gender when picking a 
jury. Indeed, although they recognized that such strikes are impermissible, lawyers listed some of the 
following stereotypes that they rely on in jury selection: ‘Asians are conservative, African-Americans 
distrust cops. Latins are emotional. Jews are sentimental. Women are hard on women . . . .’”). 
 60. See, e.g., State v. McFadden, 191 S.W.3d 648, 653 (Mo. 2006) (trial judge accepted 
prosecutor’s explanation that he struck a juror because “she lived in a high crime area and had never 
heard gunshots”); Jean Montoya, The Future of the Post-Batson Peremptory Challenge: Voir Dire by 
Questionnaire and the “Blind” Peremptory, 29 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 981, 1009 (1996) (“Batson’s 
requirement of articulating a neutral explanation for suspect peremptory challenges creates no 
substantial hurdle for ‘those . . . who are of a mind to discriminate’ . . . .”).  
 61. Polster, supra note 9, at 528–29 (footnotes omitted). 
 62. See Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472, 477 (2008) (“[W]e have stated that ‘in the absence of 
exceptional circumstances, we would defer to [the trial court].’” (second alteration in original) 
(quoting Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 366 (1991))). 
 63. See infra Part II.C. 
 64. See infra Part II.D. 
 65. See infra Part II.D. 
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suffice for weeding out jurors who are actually unfair
66
—or could suffice, 
with some tweaking
67
—and that all that is left for the peremptory 
challenge to achieve is the fulfillment of whims and stereotypes.
68
 
II. ASYMMETRICAL APPLICATIONS OF PEREMPTORY CRITIQUES  
With Part I having laid out some of the leading critiques used in 
support of demands to abolish the peremptory challenge, Part II uncovers 
the fact that each critique applies asymmetrically to the prosecution and 
defense. This militates in favor of consideration of an asymmetrical 
solution, rather than across-the-board abolition. As regards each of the 
four critiques, the distinct roles, resources, and responsibilities of the 
prosecution suggest that the arguments for reduction or removal of 
peremptory challenges are stronger with respect to the prosecution than the 
defense. 
A. Threat to Democracy  
It is of course true that every time a potential juror is removed by a 
peremptory challenge—whether exercised by the prosecution or the 
defense—that juror loses the opportunity to perform, at least in that trial, a 
key civic function.
69
 Yet, because of the roles of jury and prosecution, and 
the current lack of prosecutorial accountability,
70
 the prosecution is 
jeopardizing a broader range of democratic principles than the defense 
when it relies on peremptory challenges in order to shape its jury. 
 
 
 66. See Williams v. Norris, No. 5:02 CV00450, 2007 WL 1100417, at *6–7 (E.D. Ark. Apr. 11, 
2007) (quoting state trial judge) (“I think Batson is the most ridiculous concept that a Judge has ever 
had to work with. . . . The United States Supreme Court made a terrible mistake. They should have 
outlawed peremptory challenges, because this puts a burden on the judiciary that is untenable. . . . I 
think that we’d all be better off if we excused for cause and put twelve in the box.”). 
 67. See, e.g., Kenneth J. Melilli, Batson in Practice: What We Have Learned About Batson and 
Peremptory Challenges, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 447, 500 (1996) (“If a system allowing challenges 
for cause is administered sensibly and without the carelessness engendered by the peremptory 
challenge safety net, unfair biases should be eliminated to the extent possible without resort to 
peremptory challenges.”). 
 68. See Alschuler, supra note 54, at 1018 (“In exercising a peremptory challenge, a lawyer is 
invited to give rein to his whim or hunch—usually not a whim or hunch that a prospective juror is 
partisan or incompetent but merely that he is likely to prove less favorable to the lawyer’s position 
than his replacement.”). 
 69. See Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 407 (1991) (“[W]ith the exception of voting, for most 
citizens the honor and privilege of jury duty is their most significant opportunity to participate in the 
democratic process.”). 
 70. See infra notes 77–80 and accompanying text. 
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The jury has historically been viewed as a buffer between the 
government and the defendant,
71
 and a bulwark against oppressive 
governmental action.
72
 Having the prosecution tailor its own bulwark 
jeopardizes this function in a way that defense peremptory challenges do 
not.
73
  
The prosecution is envisaged as representing the People,
74
 whereas the 
defense attorney’s primary duty is to an individual client.
75
 Having the 
prosecution pick and choose among the people in selecting its jury 
therefore threatens this representative function in a way that defense 
peremptory challenges do not.
76
 
Effective representation of the people requires accountability to them,
77
 
and a prosecution that whittles juries down to a selected subgroup of the 
community avoids accountability to a cross-section of the people.
78
 This 
avoidance of accountability compounds a lack of accountability that exists 
 
 
 71. See Nancy S. Marder, Justice Stevens, the Peremptory Challenge, and the Jury, 74 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 1683, 1724 (2006) (citing Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968), for the proposition 
that the jury’s role is to provide “an inestimable safeguard against the corrupt or overzealous 
prosecutor and against the compliant, biased or eccentric judge”). 
 72. See id. (describing the Supreme Court’s view of the jury “as a bulwark against governmental 
oppression”); Katherine Goldwasser, Limiting a Criminal Defendant’s Use of Peremptory Challenges: 
On Symmetry and the Jury in a Criminal Trial, 102 HARV. L. REV. 808, 826 (1989) (quoting Duncan 
v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 155 (1968)) (“[T]he Framers of our federal and state constitutions granted 
criminal defendants the right to trial by jury ‘in order to prevent oppression by the Government.’ . . . 
They were therefore particularly concerned about unchecked prosecutorial power.”). 
 73. See JON M. VAN DYKE, JURY SELECTION PROCEDURES: OUR UNCERTAIN COMMITMENT TO 
REPRESENTATIVE PANELS 167 (1977) (“If the jury is to represent the conscience of the community in 
all its diversity, then no shade of opinion should be excluded. Otherwise, the defendant is not being 
judged simply by his community but rather by those members of his community who are approved—to 
the extent possible depending upon the number and method of peremptory strikes—by the 
government’s representative in court.”). 
 74. See Alafair S. Burke, Prosecutors and Peremptories, 97 IOWA L. REV. 1467, 1475 (2012) 
(“Prosecutors . . . represent a diversely constituted public. As such, they are in essence lawyers for the 
very communities disenfranchised by race-based peremptory challenges.”). 
 75. See H. Richard Uviller, The Advocate, The Truth, and Judicial Hackles: A Reaction to Judge 
Frankel’s Idea, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1067, 1070 (1975) (“The Code of Professional Responsibility 
enjoins defense counsel to be faithful, resourceful and relentless in the service of his client’s interest. 
No such injunction directs the prosecutor; he has no client, no interest save the interest of justice.”). 
 76. Sheri Lynn Johnson, Batson Ethics for Prosecutors and Trial Court Judges, 73 CHI.-KENT L. 
REV. 475, 475 (1998) (describing jurors as citizens whose interests the prosecutor “is sworn to 
protect”). 
 77. See Angela J. Davis, Prosecution and Race: The Power and Privilege of Discretion, 67 
FORDHAM L. REV. 13, 57 (1998) (“[T]he current system of choosing state and local prosecutors 
through the electoral process was established for the purpose of holding prosecutors accountable to the 
people they serve.”). 
 78. See VAN DYKE, supra note 73, at 139 (“[I]f the jury panel sent into the courtroom is 
representative and thus fairly reflects the community’s biases, challenging certain jurors because of 
their prejudices may alter the cross-section of views represented.”).  
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throughout the prosecution’s work.
79
 Even though prosecutorial elections 
offer the promise of accountability, Ronald Wright has argued that they 
“do a poor job” in this regard.
80
  
The ability to hone the jury pool down to a selected group spares the 
prosecution from the operation of incentives that may benefit the public. 
In other areas of the prosecutor’s work, scholars have asserted that 
prosecutorial incentives currently point too strongly toward maximizing 
conviction rates
81
 and often maximizing prison time.
82
 Scholars have 
proposed ways in which incentives might be adjusted in order to help 
bring about prosecutorial accountability.
83
 In the jury context, too, 
reducing the prosecution’s access to the peremptory challenge might 
increase the incentives on the prosecution to address the community’s 
concerns,
84
 and thus help ensure that the prosecution is being held 
accountable to the broader community. 
 
 
 79. See, e.g., Steven Alan Reiss, Prosecutorial Intent in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 135 
U. PA. L. REV. 1365, 1365 (1987) (“[F]ew operate in a vacuum so devoid of externally enforceable 
constraints.”). This lack of accountability has been loudly and increasingly bemoaned, especially as 
the prosecution’s power and influence continue to surge. See William J. Stuntz, The Pathological 
Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 506 (2001) (concluding that prosecutors are “the 
criminal justice system’s real lawmakers”); Rachel E. Barkow, Prosecutorial Administration: 
Prosecutor Bias and the Department of Justice, 99 VA. L. REV. 271, 273–74 (2013) (“[W]e are living 
in a time of ‘prosecutorial administration,’ with prosecutors at the helm of every major federal 
criminal justice matter.”). 
 80. Ronald F. Wright, Beyond Prosecutor Elections, 67 SMU L. REV. 593, 593, 608 (2014) 
(adding that “elections do not give chief prosecutors enough guidance about the priorities and policies 
they should pursue to achieve public safety at an appropriate fiscal and human cost,” and that 
prosecutors’ choices are “unresponsive to changes in public priorities and blind to the cost side of 
criminal justice”). 
 81. See, e.g., Roberts, supra note 29, at 637. 
 82. See Sonja B. Starr, Sentence Reduction as a Remedy for Prosecutorial Misconduct, 97 GEO. 
L.J. 1509, 1513 (2009) (“Although their motivations vary, prosecutors have many reasons to prefer 
longer sentences: political pressures, ideology, office policy and culture, and career interests.”). 
 83. See, e.g., Robert J. Smith & Justin D. Levinson, The Impact of Implicit Racial Bias on the 
Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 795, 826 (2012) (proposing that 
prosecutors could be incentivized “to live in neighborhoods disproportionately impacted by the 
charging decisions made by the district attorney’s office”); Adam M. Gershowitz, An Informational 
Approach to the Mass Imprisonment Problem, 40 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 47, 65–66 (2008) (urging that state 
officials send monthly bulletins to prosecutors, detailing state incarceration rates and prison 
overcrowding, in the hope that they bear this information in mind when they choose plea offers); 
Robert L. Misner, Recasting Prosecutorial Discretion, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 717, 720–21 
(1996) (suggesting that county prosecutors, who drive incarceration in state prisons, and yet do not 
have to pay for it, should be allocated an imprisonment budget and should be billed if they splurge 
beyond it); Russell M. Gold, Promoting Democracy in Prosecution, 86 WASH. L. REV. 69, 72–74 
(2011) (outlining a proposal to ensure that prosecutors consider “previously overlooked costs” created 
by prosecutorial decisions). 
 84. See Daniel C. Richman, Old Chief v. United States: Stipulating Away Prosecutorial 
Accountability?, 83 VA. L. REV. 939, 952 (1997) (finding in the Supreme Court’s Old Chief decision 
“a determination that prosecutors must accept the consequences of a statute that reaches far too many 
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There are a wide variety of community concerns that the prosecution 
might be incentivized to address, were it less able to remove from the jury 
those assumed to have such concerns. The prosecution not only has 
control over the way in which a prosecution proceeds, but also has 
influence over many of the other activities that might provoke community 
concern: police policies and practices,
85
 legislative decision making,
86
 
prison growth,
87
 and sentencing.
88
 As an arm of the government, it also has 
the potential to influence social policies and practices.
89
 When a potential 
juror voices concern about some of these phenomena, the prosecution is 
currently able to exercise a peremptory challenge to make sure that 
person’s concern does not inform the jury’s deliberations. If the number of 
prosecutorial peremptory challenges was reduced, it is possible that 
addressing those kinds of concerns would become more important to the 
prosecution.
90
  
It is commonly assumed, for example, that the prosecution directs its 
peremptory challenges disproportionately against people of color in part 
because of an (accurate) assumption that their view of law enforcement is 
relatively likely to be negative.
91
 Lessening the prosecution’s access to 
 
 
cases that do not comport with popular notions of criminality”); Note, Judging the Prosecution: Why 
Abolishing Peremptory Challenges Limits the Dangers of Prosecutorial Discretion, 119 HARV. L. 
REV. 2121, 2137 (2006) (“[T]he real power of the cross-representative petit jury is its potential to 
constrain the exercise of prosecutorial discretion in a way that courts and others cannot.”). 
 85. See Ben David, Community-Based Prosecution in North Carolina: An Inside-out Approach 
to Public Service at the Courthouse, on the Street, and in the Classroom, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 
373, 385 (2012) (discussing district attorney participation in law enforcement training in the Fifth 
District of North Carolina); Marc L. Miller & Samantha Caplinger, Prosecution in Arizona: Practical 
Problems, Prosecutorial Accountability, and Local Solutions, 41 CRIME & JUST. 265, 297 (2012) 
(discussing training provided by the Pinal County Attorney's Office to all local police officers). 
 86. See Stuntz, supra note 79, at 534 (“[L]egislators have good reason to listen when prosecutors 
urge some statutory change.”); Barkow, supra note 79, at 314–15 (“Politicians want to keep the 
powerful interests and the public happy, and that means giving the Department [of Justice] what it 
wants.”).  
 87. See John F. Pfaff, The Micro and Macro Causes of Prison Growth, 28 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 
1237, 1239 (2012) (“[A]t least since 1994, prison growth has been driven primarily by prosecutors 
increasing the rate at which they file charges against arrestees.”). 
 88. See Ronald F. Wright, Sentencing Commissions as Provocateurs of Prosecutorial Self-
Regulation, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1010, 1011–12 (2005). 
 89. See Bruce A. Green & Alafair S. Burke, The Community Prosecutor: Questions of 
Professional Discretion, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 285, 294 (2012) (pointing out that part of the 
paradigm shift involved in the turn to community prosecution involves a reduction in prosecutorial 
autonomy and “more interaction with other officials and public representatives in order to deal with 
criminal and social problems in a more comprehensive manner”).  
 90. For an exploration of the influence of litigation costs on prosecutorial behavior, see Albert 
W. Alschuler, Courtroom Misconduct by Prosecutors and Trial Judges, 50 TEX. L. REV. 629, 652 
(1972). 
 91. See State v. Buggs, 581 N.W.2d 329, 346 (Minn. 1998) (Page, J., dissenting) (citing a 
Minnesota Supreme Court’s Task Force Report for the notion that “[p]eople of color have a general 
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peremptory challenges would increase the incentives for the government 
to address the causes of that negative view. It is commonly the case that 
prosecutors justify their use of peremptory challenges on the basis that a 
juror lives in a “bad or crime-ridden neighborhood,”
92
 is “inured to 
violence or drugs,”
93
 or “mistrust[s] the police.”
94
 Lessening the 
prosecution’s access to peremptory challenges would mean that the 
prosecutor, as a governmental actor whose work is connected with these 
phenomena, bears some of the burden of these social ills.
95
 As for racial 
disparity, one of the most striking facets of our criminal justice system,
96
 it 
currently acts not as a cost that must be borne by the most powerful player 
in the criminal justice system, the prosecutor,
97
 but as a justification for 
 
 
distrust of the criminal justice system”); MINN. SUPREME COURT TASK FORCE ON RACIAL BIAS IN THE 
JUDICIAL SYS., FINAL REPORT 36 (1993); Burke, supra note 74, at 1473 (“Empirical evidence 
demonstrates that people of color are more likely to be skeptical of law enforcement than white 
jurors.”); Marder, supra note 71, at 1725 (noting that prosecutors have used peremptory challenges “to 
remove African-Americans and members of other minority groups,” assuming “that these citizens 
would be more critical of the government and its case because they have been treated less well by 
police and other governmental actors than those in the majority”). 
 92. Johnson, supra note 76, at 499 (“Assertions that the juror lives in a bad or crime-ridden 
neighborhood are also problematic. Courts have upheld the race-neutrality and relevance of 
neighborhood on several theories: residents are inured to violence or drugs, residents are more likely to 
mistrust the police or to have acquaintances that are involved in illegal activities, or most specifically, 
that the juror lives in the area in which the crime was committed.”). 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. See Goldwasser, supra note 72, at 836 (“If the disparity between our aspirations and our 
reality leads to fewer convictions, that cost (if it is a cost) can rightly be imposed on society as a 
whole.”); Green & Burke, supra note 89, at 294 (pointing out that part of the paradigm shift involved 
in the turn to community prosecution involves a reduction in prosecutorial autonomy and “more 
interaction with other officials and public representatives in order to deal with criminal and social 
problems in a more comprehensive manner”).  
 96. See Justin D. Levinson et al., Guilty by Implicit Racial Bias: The Guilty/Not Guilty Implicit 
Association Test, 8 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 187, 201 (2010) (mentioning “massive racial disparities” 
within the criminal justice system). 
 97. See Stuntz, supra note 79, at 506 (2001) (concluding that prosecutors are “the criminal 
justice system’s real lawmakers”); Barkow, supra note 79, at 273–74 (“[W]e are living in a time of 
‘prosecutorial administration,’ with prosecutors at the helm of every major federal criminal justice 
matter.”); Alexandra Natapoff, Gideon Skepticism, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1049, 1078–79 (2013) 
(shaping her reform proposal in light of the fact that the prosecutor “holds many if not most of the 
cards, and that therefore it makes sense to impose on those powerful players greater responsibilities for 
the overall integrity of the system”). Many of the costs of prosecution are currently externalized and, 
therefore, provide no incentive to cabin those costs. See Gold, supra note 83, at 105 (pointing out that 
prosecutors externalize, and thus fail to take into account, the costs of incarceration and public 
defense, and proposing that prosecutors be required to reveal to voters the costs that they are incurring 
or anticipate incurring so that the costs can be internalized and can shape decisions about whether to 
charge, what to charge, and what sentences to recommend); Misner, supra note 83, at 719 (“The 
current flaw in the evolving power of the prosecutor is the failure to force her to face the full cost of 
prosecutorial decisions.”); id. at 720 (explaining that because incarceration driven by local prosecutors 
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prosecutorial peremptory challenges.
98
 In the Minnesota case of State v. 
McRae, for example, an African-American juror shared her concerns about 
racial disparity and the slim chance that the African-American defendant 
would receive a jury of his peers.
99
 Far from her voice creating any 
incentive for change, her voice helped incentivize what she feared, 
because her concerns were used and accepted as a reason to remove her 
from the jury.
100
 
A reduction in prosecutorial peremptory challenges would place the 
burden for some of these social ills on a government actor whose work has 
some connection with these phenomena, rather than allowing the easy 
removal of unsatisfied customers.
101
 In this way, one can see that the 
argument that peremptory challenges are damaging to democracy in part 
 
 
is paid for by the state, “the prosecutor has little incentive to create prosecutorial guidelines, to become 
an active participant in crime prevention programs, or to find less costly means of punishment”). 
 98. See State v. Buggs, 581 N.W.2d 329, 345 (Minn. 1998) (Page, J., dissenting) (declaring the 
importance of “being able to see and understand the racial impact of permitting prosecutors to exclude 
from service prospective jurors who do nothing more than express concerns about the racial makeup of 
the jury panel and our justice system’s treatment of people of color”). 
 99. State v. McRae, No. CI-91-1461, 1992 Minn. App. LEXIS 554, at *3-4 (Minn. Ct. App. June 
10, 1992), rev’d, 494 N.W.2d 252 (Minn. 1992) 
 100. See id. (endorsing prosecutorial justification for a peremptory strike). The trial court’s 
acceptance of these prosecutorial justifications was overturned on appeal, with the Minnesota Supreme 
Court declaring that “[t]o allow the striking of this juror on the basis of those answers in effect would 
allow a prosecutor to strike any fair-minded, reasonable black person from the jury panel who 
expressed any doubt the [sic] ‘the system’ is perfect.” State v. McRae, 494 N.W.2d 252, 257 (Minn. 
1992); see also Buggs, 581 N.W.2d at 347 (Page, J., dissenting) (“Permitting prospective jurors to be 
excluded from service because their personal experience bears out what we said in our Task Force 
Report, makes no sense, but does make a mockery of our efforts to bring about racial fairness. In 
saying this, I do not mean to call into question this court’s commitment to eradicate racial bias from 
Minnesota’s judicial system. We must, however, move beyond rhetoric.”); MINN. SUPREME COURT 
TASK FORCE ON RACIAL BIAS IN THE JUDICIAL SYS., supra note 91, at 36 (1993) (finding that “[j]ury 
pools rarely are representative of the racial composition of a community” and that “[p]eople of color 
have a general distrust of the criminal justice system and exclusion from jury service fosters that 
distrust.”). 
 101. See Goldwasser, supra note 72, at 836 (“If the disparity between our aspirations and our 
reality leads to fewer convictions, that cost (if it is a cost) can rightly be imposed on society as a 
whole.”); Green & Burke, supra note 89, at 294 (pointing out that part of the paradigm shift involved 
in the turn to community prosecution involves a reduction in prosecutorial autonomy and “more 
interaction with other officials and public representatives in order to deal with criminal and social 
problems in a more comprehensive manner”).  
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because they threaten the opportunity for jurors to learn is a limited one;
102
 
they also threaten the ability of jurors to teach.
103
 
Some prosecutors’ offices have indicated an interest in greater 
responsiveness and accountability to the community through a variety of 
“community prosecution” initiatives.
104
 These initiatives are said to aim at 
increasing the extent to which the prosecution learns about, responds to, 
and is accountable to the community’s needs,
105
 but they have been 
criticized as containing little substance.
106
 Requiring that prosecutors hear 
more of the voice of the community in the jury trial, and that they be 
responsive to that community voice, would help provide some of that 
substance.
107
 
In these ways, threats to democracy created by the prosecution 
peremptory challenge are greater than those created by the defense 
peremptory challenge. Reduction of the number of peremptory challenges 
allocated to the prosecution may provide some of the accountability that is 
currently lacking in the incentive system, and electoral system, within 
 
 
 102. See Marder, supra note 71, at 1717 (quoting ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN 
AMERICA 275 (J.P. Mayer ed., George Lawrence trans., Anchor Press 1969) (1840)) (“Without 
peremptories, these jurors who would have been excluded will now benefit from the jury’s educational 
function, in which the jury serves as a ‘free school,’ teaching citizens about the responsibilities of self-
governance in a democracy.”). 
 103. John F. Stinneford has explored a related problem with the federal prosecution of “street 
crime.” The ability of law enforcement to escape unfavorable local juries by bringing cases into 
federal court allows law enforcement to “avoid confronting problems in its relationship to the 
community immediately below it (the people it protects).” John F. Stinneford, Subsidiarity, 
Federalism and Federal Prosecution of Street Crime 23 (Univ. of St. Thomas Sch. of Law Legal 
Studies Research Paper Series, Paper No. 05-19), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=847968. “If local law enforcement can avoid the public manifestation of [local distrust of 
the police] by bringing risky cases into federal court, it will have less incentive to confront the much 
more difficult (and important) problem of its relationship to the community it serves.” Id. 
 104. See, e.g., Kelley Bowden Gray, Comment, Community Prosecution: After Two Decades, Still 
New Frontiers, 32 J. LEGAL PROF. 199 (2008). 
 105. See Reenah L. Kim, Note, Legitimizing Community Consent to Local Policing: The Need for 
Democratically Negotiated Community Representation on Civilian Advisory Councils, 36 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 461, 481 (2001). 
 106. See Alafair S. Burke, Unpacking New Policing: Confessions of a Former Neighborhood 
District Attorney, 78 WASH. L. REV. 985, 1010 (2003) (pointing out gap between the community’s 
preferences and the proposals put forth by community police and prosecutors). 
 107. See Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519–20 & n.15 (1968) (juries “maintain a link 
between contemporary community values and the penal system,” and “speak for” the community); 
Paul H. Robinson, The Ongoing Revolution in Punishment Theory: Doing Justice as Controlling 
Crime, 42 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1089, 1107 (2010) (“One may well ask how well current American criminal 
law matches the community’s intuitions of justice. The short answer is: not well. Modern crime-
control programs, such as three strikes, high drug-offense penalties, adult prosecution of juveniles, 
narrowing the insanity defense, strict liability offenses, and the felony-murder rule, all distribute 
criminal liability and punishment in ways that seriously conflict with lay persons’ intuitions of 
justice.”). 
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which prosecutors operate, and that community prosecution purports to 
strive toward. 
B. Policing Problems  
The Batson doctrine certainly presents formidable challenges to both 
trial judges and appellate judges, whether the prosecution or the defense 
exercised the contested peremptory challenges: one commentator has 
referred to Batson as an “enforcement nightmare.”
108
 Yet there is some 
indication that the failures to police purposeful discrimination successfully 
have been more glaring in the case of prosecutorial peremptory challenges, 
and that when scrutinizing defense peremptory challenges, judges have 
been able to find rigor and depth in the doctrine. 
In one of the largest empirical investigations of Batson’s application, 
Kenneth Melilli reviewed virtually all of the federal and state Batson 
decisions published in the seven years after the Supreme Court’s 
decision.
109
 His research uncovered a higher probability of success for 
Batson claims made by the prosecution than by the defense.
110
 A more 
recent analysis of a subset of Batson claims demonstrated ways in which 
federal courts found greater depth and rigor in the Batson doctrine when 
evaluating Batson claims made by the prosecution (each of which was 
ultimately upheld) than when evaluating Batson claims by the defense 
(each of which was ultimately rejected).
111
 
Several commentators echo these findings in their assertions that the 
most glaring policing failures have occurred in response to prosecutorial 
peremptory strikes. Abbe Smith has noted that “[t]he problem with Batson 
is that it is so easily overcome by prosecutors.”
112
 Charles Ogletree has 
attributed the policing problem to the same players.
113
 
 
 
 108. Pizzi, supra note 55, at 134. 
 109. See Melilli, supra note 67.  
 110. See id. at 459 (success rate of 84.62% for prosecutors, as opposed to 15.87% for criminal 
defendants). Naturally, this does not establish that the defense challenges were more carefully 
screened. See id. (pointing out that it may be that prosecutors are “institutionally more selective about 
making the type of allegations inherent in a Batson challenge”).  
 111. See Anna Roberts, Disparately Seeking Jurors: Disparate Impact and the (Mis)use of Batson, 
45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1359 (2012) (analyzing twenty-nine decisions resolving Batson claims made by 
the defense and three decisions resolving Batson claims made by the prosecution).  
 112. Abbe Smith, “Nice Work if You Can Get It”: “Ethical” Jury Selection in Criminal Defense, 
67 FORDHAM L. REV. 523, 543 (1998). 
 113. See Charles J. Ogletree, Just Say No!: A Proposal to Eliminate Racially Discriminatory Uses 
of Peremptory Challenges, 31 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1099, 1107 (1994) (“[I]n many jurisdictions . . . 
Batson has been more or less undermined by prosecutors who fabricate facially neutral reasons for 
striking minority jurors, and trial courts that have difficulty evaluating such reasons.”); id. at 1110 
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Increased attention needs to be given to the possibility that the policing 
difficulties of Batson are greater with respect to prosecutorial peremptory 
challenges than with respect to those exercised by the defense. It is worth 
reexamining, for example, the implied critique contained in the assertion 
that  
[r]uling on Batson challenges . . . courts have accepted that 
prospective jurors were struck for being too old or too young; too 
vocal or too passive; too educated or too uneducated; for being 
single or because of a marital relationship; and for being accused of 
a crime or having been a victim of a crime.
114
  
Upon doing so, one finds an additional fact omitted from this description: 
each of these peremptory challenges was made by the prosecution.
115
 
In light of the possibility of unequal policing, additional empirical 
research should be conducted on the question of whether the policing, and 
policing problems, are uniform. It might not be surprising were the 
research to suggest an asymmetry. It remains the case that prosecutors are 
particularly drawn to peremptory challenges targeted at African 
Americans,
116
 the constituency that the Batson doctrine was set up to 
protect.
117
 Defense challenges, by contrast, are often more likely to focus 
 
 
(“Ineffective scrutiny of prosecution explanations is the single greatest problem hindering the effective 
implementation of Batson.”). 
 114. Polster, supra note 9, at 528–29 (footnotes omitted). 
 115. See United States v. Jynes, 197 Fed. Appx. 351, 353 (5th Cir. 2006); Stokes v. State, 194 
S.W.3d 762, 764 (Ark. 2004); People v. Cowan, 236 P.3d 1074, 1114 (Cal. 2010); People v. Lomax, 
234 P.3d 377, 413 (Cal. 2010); People v. Hamilton, 200 P.3d 898, 933 (Cal. 2009); People v. 
Ledesma, 140 P.3d 657, 687 (Cal. 2006); People v. Jurado, 131 P.3d 400, 423 (Cal. 2006); People v. 
Reynoso, 74 P.3d 852, 865–66 (Cal. 2003); People v. Allen, No. A118253, 2008 WL 2673363, at *6 
(Cal. Ct. App. July 9, 2008); State v. Holloway, 977 A.2d 750, 758 (Conn. App. Ct. 2009); Sykes v. 
State, 953 A.2d 261, 270 (Del. 2008); Roberts v. State, 651 S.E.2d 689, 693–94 (Ga. 2007); Walker v. 
State, 640 S.E.2d 274, 277 (Ga. 2007); Taylor v. State, 620 S.E.2d 363, 366 (Ga. 2005); People. v. 
Davis, 677 N.E.2d 1340, 1345 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997); People v. Gaston, 628 N.E.2d 699, 701 (Ill. App. 
Ct. 1993); State v. Jacobs, 32 So. 3d 227, 231 (La. 2010); State v. Givens, 888 So. 2d 329, 340 (La. Ct. 
App. 2004); Pitchford v. State, 45 So.3d 216, 226 (Miss. 2010); Horne v. State, 825 So. 2d 627, 636 
(Miss. 2002); State v. Terry, 928 S.W.2d 879, 884 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996); State v. Williams, 922 S.W.2d 
845, 859 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996); State v. Myers, 603 N.W.2d 378, 386 (Neb. 1999); Morales v. State, 
No. 54180, 2010 WL 3503519, at *1 (Nev. July 15, 2010); Munoz v. State, 238 P.3d 840 (Nev. 2008); 
People v. Hecker, 942 N.E.2d 248 (N.Y. 2010); State v. Mulligan, 736 N.W.2d 808, 820–21 (S.D. 
2007); State v. Martin, 683 N.W.2d 399, 403 (S.D. 2004); Carroll v. State, No. 10-08-00413-CR, 2010 
WL 5142386, at *7 (Tex. Ct. App. Dec. 15, 2010). 
 116. See, e.g., David C. Baldus et al., The Use of Peremptory Challenges in Capital Murder 
Trials: A Legal and Empirical Analysis, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 3, 48 (2001).  
 117. See Roberts, supra note 111, at 1416 (describing the Supreme Court doctrine as “rooted in 
the need to protect African Americans”). 
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on white jurors.
118
 It would not be unprecedented for a legal structure set 
up to protect a minority group to evolve so that it offers equal or greater 
benefit to the majority.
119
 
C. Harmfulness  
Drawing in part on the sense that Batson is an inadequate policing 
device, commentators have decried the harms that peremptory 
challenges—and particularly discriminatory peremptory challenges—are 
said to cause. Here, again, the critique has asymmetrical application, given 
differences between prosecution and defense peremptory challenges that 
relate to documented harm, impact on racial diversity, and damage to 
ethical precepts. 
Discriminatory use of prosecutorial peremptory challenges has a long 
history, preceding and following Batson. Prosecutorial abuse of the 
peremptory challenge was the basis for the claim in Batson.
120
 Before 
Batson, the Supreme Court had already catalogued a history of 
discriminatory prosecutorial challenges in the 1965 case of Swain v. 
Alabama.
121
 It did the same in Batson,
122
 and again in Miller-El v. 
Cockrell.
123
 A smoking gun emerged in 1997, when a prosecutorial 
 
 
 118. See Mary R. Rose, The Peremptory Challenge Accused of Race or Gender Discrimination? 
Some Data from One County, 23 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 695, 698–99 (1999). 
 119. See Melilli, supra note 67, at 463 (examining all published cases from April 30, 1986, the 
date of the Batson decision, through December 31, 1993, and finding that Batson challenges made on 
behalf of white jurors had a 53.33% success rate, while those made on behalf of African-American 
jurors had a success rate of 16.95%); J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127 (1994) (upholding Batson 
gender discrimination claim brought on behalf of male jurors); Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991) 
(upholding Batson racial discrimination claim brought by white defendant); Lisa A. Crooms, 
“Everywhere There’s War”: A Racial Realist's Reconsideration of Hate Crimes Statutes, 1999 GEO. J. 
GENDER & L. 41, 57 (noting that “hate crime ordinances fail to provide adequate protection to African-
Americans, while race-based penalty enhancement mechanisms afford whites more protection from 
racially-motivated violence”); Ann Scales, Feminist Legal Method: Not So Scary, 2 UCLA WOMEN’S 
L.J. 1, 8 (1992) (“It is no accident that a majority of equal protection sex discrimination cases decided 
by the Supreme Court have been brought by men. It is no accident that the hot racial issue in equal 
protection doctrine is ‘reverse discrimination’ challenges to affirmative action plans, that is, claims by 
white people that they are victims of racism.”). 
 120. See Sheri Lynn Johnson, Unconscious Racism and the Criminal Law, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 
1016, 1032 & n.104 (1988) (citing Justice Marshall’s Batson concurrence and its review of data from 
four jurisdictions to illustrate “the overwhelming propensity of prosecutors to strike black jurors from 
cases with black defendants”). 
 121. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 234–35 (1965) (Goldberg J., dissenting) (“[T]he State . . . 
participates, in Talladega County, in employing the striking or peremptory challenge system to exclude 
Negroes from jury services in cases where white men are involved.”).  
 122. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 103–04 (1986) (Marshall, J., concurring). 
 123. Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 334–35, 347 (2003) (“[T]he culture of the District 
Attorney’s office in the past was suffused with bias against African-Americans in jury selection.”). 
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training video revealed explicit advice by a then-assistant district attorney 
in Philadelphia to rely on prohibited group-based assumptions.
124
 If one 
adopts the common imagery of the peremptory challenge as a weapon
125
—
and in the case of capital trials,
126
 a potentially deadly weapon
127
—the 
grounds for restricting the use of this weapon based on past conduct seem 
clearer for the prosecution than for the defense.
128
  
Both historically and in recent trials, the statistical tendency of 
prosecutors to exercise their peremptory challenges against people of color 
has meant that prosecutorial challenges are more likely than defense 
challenges to reduce racial diversity on the jury.
129
 Indeed, because the 
group targeted by the prosecution for removal is frequently smaller than 
that targeted by the defense,
130
 the prosecutor is more easily able to 
remove that group from the jury box entirely. A reduction in jury diversity 
is a significant loss, not least because diversity appears to enhance a jury’s 
effectiveness in many ways,
131
 including imposing some sort of limitation 
on the operation of bias.
132
 
 
 
 124. See Edward S. Adams & Christian J. Lane, Constructing a Jury That Is Both Impartial and 
Representative: Utilizing Cumulative Voting in Jury Selection, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 703, 708 (1998); 
Lark v. Beard, 495 F. Supp. 2d 488, 493–94 (E.D. Pa. 2007). 
 125. See, e.g., United States v. Yepiz, 685 F.3d 840, 841 (9th Cir. 2012) (“One of the most 
valuable weapons in the arsenal of the trial attorney is the peremptory challenge.”); Betts v. United 
States, 132 F. 228, 235 (1st Cir. 1904) (“[T]he right to challenge peremptorily . . . is among the most 
useful weapons of defense put in the hands of an accused person. It is the only method of cutting off 
underground, malevolent currents, visible at some times to no one except the accused and his counsel, 
and sometimes not even to both of them.”). 
 126. See Marder, supra note 71, at 1729 (noting that this is the setting where “the consequences 
are most severe”). 
 127. See Baldus et al., supra note 116, at 10 (“[Pennsylvania’s] comparative advantage in the use 
of peremptory challenges has several consequences for capital defendants; it enhances the probability 
of death for all defendants; it raises the level of racial discrimination in the application of the death 
penalty; and it denies defendants a trial by a jury that includes at least one of their ‘peers.’”).  
 128. See VAN DYKE, supra note 73, at 166–67 (discussing a precursor to the peremptory 
challenge—the government’s ability to ask a potential juror to “stand aside”—and noting that “[e]ven 
those early courts that were least critical of the practice of allowing the prosecution to stand jurors 
aside felt that the practice should end if the prosecutor abused it); id. (“The practice [of exercising 
prosecutorial peremptory challenges] is being abused—the prosecutor frequently uses its peremptories 
to eliminate entire ethnic groups—and it is time to consider some remedial measures,” including 
“tak[ing] away all peremptory challenges from the prosecution.”). 
 129. See Tanya E. Coke, Note, Lady Justice May Be Blind, but Is She a Soul Sister? Race-
Neutrality and the Ideal of Representative Juries, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 327, 332 (1994). 
 130. See Baldus et al., supra note 116, at 128 (finding, based on Philadelphia research, that “the 
prime target groups of the prosecution are smaller in number than those of defense counsel”). 
 131. See Marder, supra note 71, at 1725 (“[A] diverse jury affords the best protection to a 
defendant that the government’s case will be carefully and critically examined.”). 
 132. See Samuel R. Sommers, Race and the Decision Making of Juries, 12 LEGAL & 
CRIMINOLOGICAL PSYCHOL. 171, 181 (2007) (“[R]acially diverse juries deliberated longer, discussed 
more trial evidence, and made fewer factually inaccurate statements in discussing the evidence than 
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It is certainly the case that defense attorneys are prohibited from 
purposeful discrimination in their peremptory strikes, just as prosecutors 
are.
133
 Pointing out asymmetries in the harmfulness of peremptory strikes 
is not intended as an endorsement of purposeful discrimination by the 
defense. However, a reframing may help distinguish the situation of the 
parties. Sheri Johnson raises the question of whether all defense 
peremptory challenges that take account of race should be termed 
discriminatory.
134
 In a context such as the contemporary criminal justice 
system, where a disproportionate number of defendants are people of 
color,
135
 and where lack of diversity on the jury—especially an all-white 
jury
136
—has a tendency to increase bias,
137
 a defense peremptory challenge 
exercised against a white juror might not count as racial discrimination 
under a “rough definition” of the term that Johnson lays out
138
: “racial 
discrimination in jury selection is any jury selection practice that is 
 
 
did all-White juries. Interestingly, these effects, too, cannot be explained solely in terms of the 
performance of Black jurors, as White jurors were more thorough and accurate during deliberations on 
diverse vs. all-White juries. A potential implication of these findings is that one process through which 
a diverse jury composition exerts its effects is by leading White jurors to process evidence more 
thoroughly.”); Justin D. Levinson, Forgotten Racial Equality: Implicit Bias, Decisionmaking, and 
Misremembering, 57 DUKE L.J. 345, 414 (2007) (“Studies have linked culture and diversity to the 
reduction of implicit biases. These studies indicate that racially diverse juries, for example, may make 
fewer cognitive errors than homogenous jurors, and that learning about or experiencing diversity and 
multicultural ideologies in general can reduce implicit bias.”); Deborah Ramirez, Affirmative Jury 
Selection: A Proposal to Advance both the Deliberative Ideal and Jury Diversity, 1998 U. CHI. LEGAL 
FORUM 161, 162 (“[A] racially diverse jury is more likely to render a race-neutral verdict, because it is 
more likely to suppress racial bias in deliberations and to challenge inferences based on thoughtless 
racial stereotypes.”); VAN DYKE, supra note 73, at 152 (arguing that the narrowing down of the jury 
pool caused by challenges “for cause” and peremptory challenges, “although aimed at eliminating bias 
and impaneling an impartial jury, may in fact—by excluding certain types of people from the jury 
panel—increase the jury’s bias”); see also Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 388 n.21 (2010) 
(“Peremptory challenges, too, ‘provid[e] protection against [prejudice].’” (quoting Darcy v. Handy, 
351 U.S. 454, 462 (1956))). 
 133. See Andrew E. Taslitz & Sharon Styles-Anderson, Still Officers of the Court: Why the First 
Amendment Is No Bar to Challenging Racism, Sexism and Ethnic Bias in the Legal Profession, 9 GEO. 
J. LEGAL ETHICS 781, 781 n.4 (1996). 
 134. See Sheri Lynn Johnson, The Language and Culture (Not to Say Race) of Peremptory 
Challenges, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 21, 83–84 (1993). 
 135. See Abbe Smith, Defending Those People, 10 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 277, 287 (2012) (“Most 
of those accused and convicted of crime are poor. Disproportionate numbers are nonwhite.”). 
 136. See Samuel R. Sommers & Phoebe C. Ellsworth, How Much Do We Really Know About 
Race and Juries? A Review of Social Science Theory and Research, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 997, 1029 
(2003); see also Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 61 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment) 
(“Simply stated, securing representation of the defendant’s race on the jury may help to overcome 
racial bias and provide the defendant with a better chance of having a fair trial.”). 
 137. See Johnson, supra note 134, at 83–84 (“The specific assumption . . . that the total exclusion 
of black jurors from black defendant cases is likely to increase the risk of racially biased adjudications 
. . . is still valid today.”). 
 138. Id. at 85. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol92/iss6/6
 
 
 
 
 
 
2015] ASYMMETRY AS FAIRNESS 1525 
 
 
 
 
intended to increase the likelihood that racial bias will influence the 
outcome of a particular criminal trial.”
139
  
Finally, through its use of peremptory challenges, the prosecution may 
be straying from the precepts of prosecutorial ethics. With respect to 
defense ethics, Abbe Smith has argued that the ethical duty of zealous 
representation requires the defense to do whatever needs to be done with 
peremptory challenges,
140
 since a client’s fair trial, and possibly life, is at 
stake.
141
 For the prosecution, however, the relevant ethical (and 
constitutional) duties include a duty to “seek justice,” rather than merely 
convictions.
142
 The prosecutor is a “minister of justice”
143
 and required to 
strive for procedural justice for every defendant.
144
 Commentators often 
appear to lose sight of this distinction in the peremptory context, accepting 
without qualm that while the defense will seek to remove all potential 
jurors that it might suspect would favor the prosecution, and seek to keep 
all those that it might suspect would favor the defense, the prosecution will 
simply do the reverse.
145
 As Barbara Babcock puts it, for example, “[o]f 
 
 
 139. Id.; see also Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 644 (1991) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) (“Both sides have peremptory challenges, and they are sometimes used to assure rather 
than to prevent a racially diverse jury.”). 
 140. See Smith, supra note 112, at 565 (“No matter how personally distasteful or morally 
unsettling, zealous advocacy demands that criminal defense lawyers use whatever they can, including 
stereotypes, to defend their clients.”). 
 141. See id. at 530–31 (“It is not that I believe that racial or demographic stereotypes are an 
accurate proxy for the attitudes and life experience of all prospective jurors. I do not. It is that, absent a 
meaningful exploration of the latter, I am stuck with the former, and it would be foolhardy or worse 
not to at least consider the generalizations on which the stereotypes are based.”). 
 142. See Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 648–49 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“The 
function of the prosecutor under the Federal Constitution is not to tack as many skins of victims as 
possible to the wall. His function is to vindicate the right of people as expressed in the laws and give 
those accused of crime a fair trial.”); AM. BAR ASS’N, ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: 
PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION § 3-1.2 (3d ed. 1993), available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/publications/criminal_justice_section_archive/crimjust_standards_pfunc_
blk.html (“The duty of the prosecutor is to seek justice, not merely to convict.”); L. Song Richardson, 
Due Process for the Global Crime Age: A Proposal, 41 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 347, 357–58 (2008) (“The 
U.S. Constitution and the ethical rules only obligate defense attorneys to vigorously advocate their 
client’s cause. In contrast, prosecutors are duty-bound to refrain from allowing their role as advocates 
to eclipse their obligation to ensure fair proceedings. They are quasi-judicial officers who must ensure 
that trials lead to reliable outcomes that are worthy of public confidence. Hence, they are often referred 
to as ‘ministers of justice,’ reflecting their special role seeking truth and justice in adversarial criminal 
trials.” (citing MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8 cmt. [1] (2014) (“A prosecutor has the 
responsibility of a minister of justice and not simply that of an advocate.”))). 
 143. See Richardson, supra note 142, at 357. 
 144. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8 cmt. [1] (mentioning obligation “to see that 
the defendant is accorded procedural justice”). 
 145. See State v. Saintcalle, 309 P.3d 326, 363 (Wash. 2013) (González, J., concurring) 
(“[A]ttorneys use peremptory challenges to exclude unfavorable jurors, not to obtain an impartial 
jury.”); 2 ANN FAGAN GINGER, JURY SELECTION IN CIVIL AND CRIMINAL TRIALS § 18.2, at 1022 (2d 
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course, neither litigant is trying to choose ‘impartial’ jurors, but rather to 
eliminate those who are sympathetic to the other side, hopefully leaving 
only those biased for him.”
146
 But surely the picture is more 
complicated.
147
 What if the prosecution did indeed suspect that a potential 
juror was biased in favor of the prosecution? Is there an argument that the 
prosecutor should exercise a peremptory challenge against that juror, if the 
defense does not?
148
 Through a single-minded engagement in partisanship, 
the prosecution may be treading on foundational ethical and constitutional 
precepts:
149
 as Richard Uviller puts it, “the interest of justice is not a 
partisan cause.”
150
 
D. Lack of Need  
Arguments that peremptory challenges fail to serve any need that might 
counteract the harms documented in Subpart C also apply with more force 
 
 
ed. 1985) (“Despite its theoretical function, the voir dire is in reality a contest between the two 
adversaries toward the goal of selecting the jury that is most favorable to [either] side.”); Eric D. Katz, 
Comment, Striking the Peremptory Challenge from Civil Litigation: “Hey Batson, Stay Where You 
Belong!”, 11 PACE L. REV. 357, 361 n.19 (1991) (describing this as the “dog-eat-dog” approach to the 
peremptory challenge). 
 146. Barbara Allen Babcock, Voir Dire: Preserving “Its Wonderful Power”, 27 STAN. L. REV. 
545, 551 (1975); see also J. Christopher Peters, Note, Georgia v. McCollum: It’s Strike Three for 
Peremptory Challenges, but Is It the Bottom of the Ninth?, 53 LA. L. REV. 1723, 1741 (1993) 
(“Realistically, each side in a criminal proceeding is after the same distinct result: a jury which favors 
its respective side.”).  
 147. See Melilli, supra note 67, at 499 (“Because the state’s only legitimate interests are to 
provide the litigants with fair and impartial juries and to provide potential jurors with selection 
procedures that are not unfairly discriminatory, the interest of litigants in securing the most favorable 
jurors should be an irrelevant consideration.”). 
 148. See VAN DYKE, supra note 73, at 167 (“It is the duty of the prosecutor, as an officer of the 
state, to see that the accused is tried by a fair, impartial, and representative jury; it is not the role of the 
prosecutor to attempt to impanel a jury composed of those most likely to convict.”); George C. Harris, 
The Communitarian Function of the Criminal Jury Trial and the Rights of the Accused, 74 NEB. L. 
REV. 804, 816 n.49 (1995). For a suggestion of a way in which the prosecutor’s ethical duty might 
trump certain litigation efforts, see Michael C. Wallace, Sr., Make the Hand Fit the Glove: OPR Finds 
Professional Misconduct, 57 WAYNE L. REV. 497, 518 (2011) (mentioning that the prosecutor’s duty 
to represent the interests of the people includes “represent[ing] the interest of the defendant”); 
Richardson, supra note 142, at 356 (“[T]he U.S. Constitution requires prosecutors to temper their 
adversarial zeal and protect the fairness and reliability of the criminal process.”); David B. Wilkins, 
Identities and Roles: Race, Recognition, and Professional Responsibility, 57 MD. L. REV. 1502, 1585 
n.345 (1998) (suggesting that Christopher Darden, in prosecuting O.J. Simpson, arguably had 
discretion, thanks to his ethical obligation to “seek justice,” to “refuse to oppose the introduction of 
evidence impeaching the credibility of [Mark Fuhrman],” once he had been presented with “conclusive 
evidence that Fuhrman lied under oath about using racial epithets”). 
 149. See Catherine Ferguson-Gilbert, It Is Not Whether You Win or Lose, It Is How You Play the 
Game: Is the Win-Loss Scorekeeping Mentality Doing Justice for Prosecutors?, 38 CAL. W. L. REV. 
283, 289 (2001). 
 150. Uviller, supra note 75, at 1070. 
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to the prosecution than the defense. Both in advance of trial and at trial, a 
variety of phenomena combine to offer the prosecution certain advantages 
that the defense peremptory challenge has a chance to try to offset. 
Before a criminal defendant reaches the moment of being able to 
exercise peremptory challenges against potential jurors, he or she will 
already have been subject to decision making by a host of criminal justice 
players: legislators,
151
 police officers,
152
 prosecutors,
153
 defense 
attorneys,
154
 and judges.
155
 Others, such as probation officers
156
 and parole 
boards,
157
 may lie ahead. Each of these has been shown to be vulnerable to 
implicit bias,
158
 a phenomenon that is a particular threat to the criminal 
defendant population, given the disproportionate representation of people 
of color therein.
159
 Despite the implicit bias affecting these groups of 
decision makers, the criminal defendant is—with rare exceptions—stuck 
with them: no matter how extreme their bias may be, nothing like a 
peremptory challenge is permitted.
160
 The peremptory challenge process 
 
 
 151. See Robert J. Smith et al., Implicit White Favoritism in the Criminal Justice System, 66 ALA. 
L. REV. 871 (2015). 
 152. See E. Ashby Plant & B. Michelle Peruche, The Consequences of Race for Police Officers’ 
Responses to Criminal Suspects, 16 PSYCHOL. SCI. 180 (2005) (finding that, in simulations, police 
officers are more likely to shoot unarmed black suspects than unarmed white suspects). 
 153. See Michael L. Radelet & Glenn L. Pierce, Race and Prosecutorial Discretion in Homicide 
Cases, 19 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 587, 615–19 (1985) (finding charging disparities in prosecutors’ 
decisions whether to press charges against black and white potential defendants). 
 154. See Theodore Eisenberg & Sheri Lynn Johnson, Implicit Racial Attitudes of Death Penalty 
Lawyers, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 1539, 1545–56 (2004) (presenting evidence that death penalty defense 
attorneys display implicit racial biases comparable to the rest of the population). 
 155. See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski et al., Does Unconscious Racial Bias Affect Trial Judges?, 84 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1195, 1197 (2009) (it does). 
 156. See Sandra Graham & Brian S. Lowery, Priming Unconscious Racial Stereotypes About 
Adolescent Offenders, 28 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 483, 500 (2004) (identifying implicit bias directed 
against black youth in probation and police officers). 
 157. See Leo Carroll & Margaret E. Mondrick, Racial Bias in the Decision to Grant Parole, 11 
LAW & SOC’Y REV. 93 (1976). 
 158. See Roberts, supra note 27, at 833 (“‘Implicit biases’ are discriminatory biases based on 
either implicit attitudes—feelings that one has about a particular group—or implicit stereotypes—traits 
that one associates with a particular group. They are so subtle that those who hold them may not 
realize that they do.”); id. at 877; Roberts, supra note 29, at 621. The phenomenon is of course 
widespread outside the criminal justice arena as well. See John T. Jost et al., The Existence of Implicit 
Bias Is Beyond Reasonable Doubt: A Refutation of Ideological and Methodological Objections and 
Executive Summary of Ten Studies that No Manager Should Ignore, 29 RES. ORGANIZATIONAL 
BEHAV. 39 (2009) (discussing implicit bias in areas such as medicine and employment). 
 159. See Smith, supra note 135, at 287 (“Most of those accused and convicted of crime are poor. 
Disproportionate numbers are nonwhite.”). 
 160. There are a few counter-examples. Some jurisdictions allow judges to be challenged 
peremptorily. See Gabriel D. Serbulea, Due Process and Judicial Disqualification: The Need for 
Reform, 38 PEPP. L. REV. 1109, 1123 n.105 (2011) (“Seventeen states allow for peremptory 
disqualification [of judges] (without cause); three states have quasi-peremptory rules (the judge must 
recuse or transfer the recusal motion to another judge); thirty-one states do not allow peremptory 
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represents one small area in which an effort to right the balance can be 
made. 
The stages of jury selection that precede the exercising of peremptory 
challenges also contain numerous elements that favor the prosecution. 
First, though the criminal defendant is entitled to a jury pool that 
represents a cross-section of the community,
161
 the doctrine by which that 
right is enforced is widely viewed as anemic.
162
 A successful cross-section 
challenge has not been heard in federal court since 1995.
163
 Second, the 
stage at which the trial judge adjudicates challenges for cause also has the 
potential to favor the prosecution, given the racial disparity between the 
jurors targeted for removal by prosecution and defense and the 
vulnerability of judges to the same kinds of implicit racial bias that affect 
the rest of the population.
164
 Finally, the “target group” that the 
prosecution most frequently selects for peremptory challenges tends to be 
made up of people of color.
165
 People of color are not only often in the 
minority to begin with,
166
 but they are also disproportionately excluded 
from jury service through the various stages of jury selection that precede 
the peremptory challenge, including the response to summonses,
167
 
statutory disqualifications,
168
 and the granting of hardship exemptions.
169
 
This leaves less work for the prosecution to do at the peremptory 
challenge stage. The explanation from one judge, therefore, for why his 
state needed to move to symmetrical peremptory challenge allocation—
that “[t]he purpose of specifically limiting and allocating peremptory 
 
 
disqualification.”). Some public defense offices permit client choice; a proposal for more widespread 
choice in this area has recently gained traction. See Adam Liptak, Need-Blind Justice, N.Y. TIMES 
(Jan. 4, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/05/sunday-review/need-blind-justice.html. 
 161. See Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 (1979). 
 162. See State v. Buggs, 581 N.W.2d 329, 346 (Minn. 1998) (Page, J., dissenting) (citing 
Minnesota Supreme Court’s Task Force Report for notion that “jury pools rarely are representative of 
the racial composition of a community”); MINN. SUPREME COURT TASK FORCE ON RACIAL BIAS IN 
THE JUDICIAL SYS., supra note 91, at 36 (1993). 
 163. See United States v. Jackman, 46 F.3d 1240 (2d Cir. 1995); see also Ogletree, supra note 
113, at 1150 (“The correct response to [the problem of apparent unfairness in an all-white jury 
acquitting a white defendant of a crime against a black victim] is to assure that the jury pool does not 
exclude minorities.”). 
 164. See Rachlinski et al., supra note 155, at 1196–97. 
 165. See Baldus et al., supra note 116, at 48. 
 166. See id. at 128. 
 167. See Nina W. Chernoff, Wrong About the Right: How Courts Undermine the Fair Cross-
Section Guarantee by Confusing It with Equal Protection, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 141, 176–78 (2013). 
 168. See Roberts, supra note 29, at 602 (“Because rates of criminalization vary according to race, 
jury exclusions relying on criminal records have a disparate impact . . . .”). 
 169. See Natalie A. Pifer, Berghuis v. Smith: Continuing Ambiguity in Fair-Cross-Section Claims, 
44 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1035, 1038 (2011). 
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strikes by statute or rule is so one side cannot unfairly ‘stack the deck’ 
against the other”
170
—overlooks the extent to which the deck may already 
have been stacked by the time peremptory challenges become available.
171
 
Another claim, by Akhil Reed Amar, that choosing the first twelve jurors 
will keep the jury as close as possible to a cross-section of the community, 
overlooks the extent to which racially disparate filtering has already 
occurred by the time that peremptory challenges begin.
172
 
The biases harbored by jurors—both explicit and implicit—also tend to 
favor the prosecution.
173
 The explicit biases include widespread 
assumptions that police and prosecutors are unimpeachable,
174
 that the 
guilt of the accused is likely,
175
 and that the presumption of innocence is a 
fiction.
176
 The implicit biases of jurors, like those of the majority of the 
population,
177
 tend to disfavor people of color, and thus a disproportionate 
number of criminal defendants.
178
 These implicit biases can affect all of 
the main tasks that jurors are called upon to perform: evaluation of 
evidence,
179
 evaluation of behavior,
180
 recall of facts,
181
 and judgment of 
 
 
 170. Morgan v. Commonwealth, 189 S.W.3d 99, 138 (Ky. 2006) (Cooper, J., dissenting) (“[T]he 
General Assembly and, subsequently, this Court have gradually recognized that in criminal cases, as 
has always been true in civil cases, there should be a level playing field between prosecution and 
defense.”), overruled by Shane v. Commonwealth, 243 S.W.3d 336 (Ky. 2007). 
 171. See Ogletree, supra note 113, at 1143 (“The defendant’s peremptory challenge has 
sometimes been called a historic protection against governmentally ‘stacked decks.’”). 
 172. See Amar, supra note 9, at 1182 (“By and large, the first twelve persons picked by lottery 
should form the jury. The jury—and not just the venire—should be as cross-sectional of the entire 
community of the whole people as possible. Peremptory challenges should be eliminated: they allow 
repeat-player regulars—prosecutors and defense attorneys—to manipulate demographics and chisel an 
unrepresentative panel out of a cross-sectional venire.”). 
 173. See Ogletree, supra note 113, at 1147–48 (“Inasmuch as statistics show that more 
venirepersons in most criminal trials are likely to be biased against the defendant than for him or her, 
the defense peremptory serves as a necessary corrective in a way that the state’s challenge simply does 
not. The additional control over jury composition which peremptory challenges give to defendants is 
arguably necessary in order to counteract the proprosecution bias which would be found in a random 
population sample.”). 
 174. See Nancy Gertner, Is the Jury Worth Saving?, 75 B.U. L. REV. 923, 931 (1995) (reviewing 
STEPHEN J. ADLER, THE JURY: TRIAL AND ERROR IN THE AMERICAN COURTROOM (1994)) (“The 
public, with few exceptions, has enormous faith in the skill and integrity of police and prosecutors.”). 
 175. See id. (“Studies regularly suggest that juries believe that because someone is accused, they 
are likely to be guilty.”); Ogletree, supra note 113, at 1143 (“Most prospective jurors enter the 
courtroom prepared to convict an accused . . . .”). 
 176. See Toni M. Massaro, Peremptories or Peers?—Rethinking Sixth Amendment Doctrine, 
Images, and Procedures, 64 N.C. L. REV. 501, 518 n.102 (1986) (noting studies that suggest that sixty 
percent of Americans reject the presumption of innocence). 
 177. See Roberts, supra note 27, at 849–50. 
 178. See Levinson et al., supra note 96, at 189–90. 
 179. See Roberts, supra note 27, at 830. 
 180. See id. 
 181. See id. 
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guilt.
182
 While of course the prosecution may rely on witnesses who are 
people of color and therefore vulnerable to the jurors’ implicit bias,
183
 the 
findings of implicit bias research are particularly alarming in the case of 
African-American defendants. Jurors’ implicit biases not only involve 
negative attitudes and stereotypes regarding African Americans,
184
 but 
specifically involve an association of African Americans with violence,
185
 
weaponry,
186
 and guilt.
187
 The assumptions of guilt are not harmless 
mental quirks: they predict the ways in which jurors evaluate ambiguous 
evidence.
188
  
These implicit biases, statistically most likely to favor the prosecution’s 
efforts, go unmentioned and unaddressed in the majority of courthouses in 
this nation.
189
 Only a few judges have introduced innovations that aim to 
guard against this risk.
190
 Moreover, the realities of trial can in fact serve 
to reinforce potential jurors’ pro-governmental biases, first because of a 
process of acculturation to governmental norms,
191
 and second because of 
jurors’ ruminations on the potentially disturbing implications of a not 
guilty verdict.
192
 
 
 
 182. See id. 
 183. See id. 
 184. See id. at 833 (“‘Implicit biases’ are discriminatory biases based on either implicit 
attitudes—feelings that one has about a particular group—or implicit stereotypes—traits that one 
associates with a particular group. They are so subtle that those who hold them may not realize that 
they do.”). 
 185. See id. 
 186. See id. 
 187. See Levinson et al., supra note 96, at 190 (demonstrating that mock jurors “held strong 
associations between Black and Guilty, relative to White and Guilty, and [that] implicit associations 
predicted the way mock jurors evaluated ambiguous evidence”). 
 188. See id.  
 189. See Roberts, supra note 27, at 830 (explaining that “[j]uries are generally told nothing about 
implicit bias,” whether in juror orientation or in individual courtrooms). 
 190. See id. at 859 (describing efforts of District Court Judge Mark Bennett to counteract implicit 
juror bias); Janet Bond Arterton, Unconscious Bias and the Impartial Jury, 40 CONN. L. REV. 1023, 
1029–30 (2008) (outlining attempts during voir dire to guard against the effects of implicit racial bias). 
The work of North Carolina District Court Judge Louis Trosch to develop a “bench card” for judges in 
juvenile court, to ensure that they ask a uniform set of questions in making an initial determination 
about whether to order detention, provides a good example of state judicial efforts. See Right from the 
Start: The Courts Catalyzing Change Preliminary Protective Hearing Benchcard, NAT’L COUNCIL OF 
JUVENILE AND FAMILY COURT JUDGES (Mar. 1, 2010), http://www.ncjfcj.org/resource-library/ 
publications/right-start-courts-catalyzing-change-preliminary-protective-hearing-0 (judicial materials); 
Wash. & Lee Univ. Sch. of Law, Implicit Bias: MLK Day Speaker Judge Louis A. Trosch ’88, 
YOUTUBE (Jan. 22, 2013), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8xTXnkqQ-OQ (Judge Trosch 
discussing these initiatives). 
 191. See Justin D. Levinson, Suppressing the Expression of Community Values in Juries: How 
“Legal Priming” Systematically Alters the Way People Think, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 1059 (2005). 
 192. See Andrew D. Leipold, Constitutionalizing Jury Selection in Criminal Cases: A Critical 
Evaluation, 86 GEO. L.J. 945, 1007 n.300 (1998) (“[B]y the time the trial occurs, most jurors have 
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Finally, the resources of the prosecution tend to be greater than those of 
the defense.
193
 The vast majority of criminal defendants rely on 
government-provided attorneys,
194
 many of whom carry extraordinarily 
high caseloads.
195
 The resource advantage affects the entire course of the 
trial, including jury selection, in which the prosecution has greater access 
to the type of investigation that helps bring to light valid grounds to 
remove potential jurors “for cause.”
196
 
Given these various advantages possessed by the government, the need 
for the peremptory challenge seems stronger in the case of the defense. 
Two additional factors support this notion. First, empirical data provide 
some support for the idea that the defense is better able to make effective 
use of the peremptory challenge.
197
 Recent research suggests that since the 
criminal defendant is statistically more likely than the prosecutor to be a 
 
 
every reason ex ante to want a conviction and little reason to desire an acquittal. If the jury convicts, 
(1) it confirms that the police and prosecutor brought the right person to trial, (2) it removes a 
dangerous person from society, and (3) it gives some comfort to the victim that justice has been done. 
But if a jury acquits, it almost always means that (1) the wrong person was arrested, and the real guilty 
person is still at large, or (2) the right person was arrested, but the prosecution failed to put on a 
convincing case, or the trial process was otherwise mishandled.”). 
 193. See Keith A. Findley, Adversarial Inquisitions: Rethinking the Search for the Truth, 56 N.Y. 
L. SCH. L. REV. 911, 912 (2011) (“The current American system is marked by an adversary process so 
compromised by imbalance between the parties—in terms of resources and access to evidence—that 
true adversary testing is virtually impossible.”). 
 194. See Thomas H. Cohen, Who’s Better at Defending Criminals? Does Type of Defense 
Attorney Matter in Terms of Producing Favorable Case Outcomes (July 1, 2011) (unpublished 
manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1876474, at 15 (most 
recent data indicate that in felony cases in the nation’s seventy-five most populous counties, seventy-
nine percent of defendants are represented by either public defenders or assigned counsel, while only 
twenty percent are represented by private counsel).  
 195. See L. Song Richardson & Phillip Atiba Goff, Implicit Racial Bias in Public Defender 
Triage, 122 YALE L.J. 2626, 2631–32 (2013). 
 196. See Lester B. Orfield, Trial Jurors in Federal Criminal Cases, 29 F.R.D. 43, 52 (1962) 
(stating that the reasons given by the Bar Committee for the Western District of Tennessee for always 
providing the defense with more challenges than the government include the fact that “the defendant’s 
attorney does not have the means to investigate the background of prospective jurors, and so must rely 
more on hunches than the government”). 
 197. See Hans Zeisel & Shari Seidman Diamond, The Effect of Peremptory Challenges on Jury 
and Verdict: An Experiment in a Federal District Court, 30 STAN. L. REV. 491, 519 (1978) (noting 
that strikes by the defense are more likely to “work,” and that “cases in which peremptory challenges 
have an important effect on the verdict occur with some frequency”). Some caution is needed in 
assessing the empirical data in this area. The Zeisel & Diamond study, which is “the only controlled 
study of peremptory strikes on record,” Ogletree, supra note 113, at 1146, has become the most 
influential empirical study in this area. See Roger Allan Ford, Modeling the Effects of Peremptory 
Challenges on Jury Selection and Jury Verdicts, 17 GEO. MASON L. REV. 377, 387–88 (2010). The 
study is thirty-five years old and also contains warnings that “the [twelve] cases that formed the basis 
of [their] study are not a probability sample of anything,” and that the experiment “should be regarded 
as only the first step toward an understanding of the effect of peremptory challenges on jury verdicts.” 
Zeisel & Diamond, supra, at 493 (describing the results as “preliminary,” the conclusions as 
“tentative[],” and the sample as possibly “biased”). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
1532 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 92:1503 
 
 
 
 
target of bias,
198
 criminal defendants have a greater chance than the 
prosecutor of being able to detect juror bias.
199
 Second, while the 
peremptory challenge is not a constitutional right,
200
 it serves to help 
secure constitutional rights to an impartial jury and a fair trial.
201
 These 
constitutional rights, as well as the constitutionally protected values of life 
and liberty, are at stake for defendants, and not for the prosecution.
202
 
These differences in the application of the peremptory-challenge 
critiques to prosecution and defense tend not to be emphasized by the 
judges calling for abolition.
203
 That may be understandable. At least some 
of the asymmetry stems from inequities in the court system over which the 
judges preside. Yet this silence, and the move from critique to blanket 
condemnation that it permits, risks imposing, in the words of Katherine 
Goldwasser, “the cost of the disparity between our aspirations and our 
reality on individual criminal defendants, rather than on society as a 
 
 
 198. See EQUAL JUSTICE INITIATIVE, supra note 56, at 41–42 (contrasting the demographics of 
defendants with those of prosecutors). 
 199. See Jennifer A. Richeson & J. Nicole Shelton, Brief Report: Thin Slices of Racial Bias, 29 J. 
NONVERBAL BEHAVIOR 75 (2005) (finding that African Americans, and probably other marginalized 
races, have an advantage in detecting bias in others because they are more sensitive to bias, as a result 
of being inundated by it); Samuel R. Sommers & Michael I. Norton, Lay Theories About White 
Racists: What Constitutes Racism (and What Doesn’t), 9 GROUP PROCESSES & INTERGROUP REL. 117, 
134 (2006) (“[N]on-Whites are more likely to consider subtle forms of bias to be indicative of racism 
than are Whites.”); see also Betts v. United States, 132 F. 228, 235 (1st Cir. 1904) (“[T]he right to 
challenge peremptorily . . . is among the most useful weapons of defense put in the hands of an 
accused person. It is the only method of cutting off underground, malevolent currents, visible at some 
times to no one except the accused and his counsel, and sometimes not even to both of them. Without 
its uncontrolled exercise, justice would be absolutely unobtainable in many cases.”). 
 200. Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 57 (1992); Morris B. Hoffman, Peremptory Challenges 
Should Be Abolished: A Trial Judge’s Perspective, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 809, 825 (1997) (“The 
Constitution is and always has been utterly silent when it comes to the peremptory challenge.”). 
 201. See McCollum, 505 U.S. at 57 (“[P]eremptory challenges are not constitutionally protected 
fundamental rights; rather, they are but one state-created means to the constitutional end of an 
impartial jury and a fair trial. This Court repeatedly has stated that the right to a peremptory challenge 
may be withheld altogether without impairing the constitutional guarantee of an impartial jury and a 
fair trial.”); Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 481–82 (1990) (“One could plausibly argue (though we 
have said the contrary) that the requirement of an ‘impartial jury’ impliedly compels peremptory 
challenges.”); Maureen A. Howard, Taking the High Road: Why Prosecutors Should Voluntarily 
Waive Peremptory Challenges, 23 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 369, 372 n.16 (2010) (“[B]ecause the 
purpose of the peremptory challenge is a back-up for the for-cause challenge and a further guarantee of 
juror impartiality, it is noteworthy that only the defendant, and not the government, has a constitutional 
guarantee of an impartial jury under the Sixth Amendment.”); id. at 379 (noting that for cause 
challenges are constitutionally guaranteed to criminal defendants, “as the primary method by which 
the court endeavors to seat an impartial jury in satisfaction of the Sixth Amendment”). 
 202. See Ogletree, supra note 113, at 1147 (“If the state loses, it does not lose its liberty, as the 
defendant does if he or she loses.”).  
 203. See, e.g., State v. Saintcalle, 309 P.3d 326, 348 (Wash. 2013) (González, J., concurring) (no 
mention of asymmetrical application of critiques). 
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whole.”
204
 The next Part urges that trends from asymmetry to symmetry in 
peremptory challenge allocation be reversed, so that this cost can be more 
equitably distributed. 
III. PRESERVING ASYMMETRICAL APPROACHES  
Part II demonstrated that several of the leading critiques of the Batson 
regime and of peremptory challenges apply with more force to the 
prosecution’s peremptory challenges than to the defense’s peremptory 
challenges. This asymmetry in application militates in favor of an 
asymmetrical approach to the question of the peremptory challenge, rather 
than across-the-board abolition.  
This Part uncovers an asymmetrical approach to the peremptory 
challenge that is quietly being erased and suggests that the erasure should 
be halted and reversed. The asymmetry, laid out in Subpart A, is in the 
allocation of peremptory challenges to the prosecution and the defense. 
Numerous states have moved away from an asymmetrical allocation of 
peremptory challenges that provided a greater number to defense than to 
prosecution. Subpart B suggests that reversing this trend will be beneficial 
not only in the peremptory context but as a concrete form of resistance to a 
broader criminal justice trend toward symmetry, and, potentially, away 
from the fairness that asymmetry can help guarantee. 
A. Asymmetrical Allocations of Peremptory Challenges  
1. Origins of Asymmetrical Allocations  
The allocation of peremptory challenges in the United States is rooted 
in asymmetry. At the time of their importation from England, peremptory 
challenges were the “exclusive right” of defendants.
205
 The English 
Parliament had passed a statute in 1305 that eliminated the government’s 
peremptory challenge and allocated thirty-five to the defense.
206
 This 
 
 
 204. Goldwasser, supra note 72, at 838. 
 205. Frederic M. Bloom, Information Lost and Found, 100 CAL. L. REV. 635, 651 (2012); see also 
Orfield, supra note 196, at 94. This right, however, seems to have been rarely exercised. See Hoffman, 
supra note 200, at 821 (“[T]he actual use of the peremptory challenge in English criminal trials 
appears almost nonexistent over its entire seven-hundred-year history, and rare even at its zenith.”). 
 206. VAN DYKE, supra note 73, at 147. The picture is complicated, however, by the existence of a 
common law procedure known as “standing aside,” which was available to the prosecution in England, 
and in some of the colonies, and which resembled a hybrid of the modern challenge for cause and 
peremptory challenge. Id. at 148 (noting that “[c]ourt practice thus allowed the crown to continue a 
procedure that Parliament had explicitly eliminated”). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
1534 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 92:1503 
 
 
 
 
allocation of peremptory challenges to defendants was adopted as part of 
the common law in the early colonial and state courts in North America.
207
 
The first federal statute allocating peremptory challenges, enacted in 
1790, allocated peremptory challenges only to the defense.
208
 The second 
federal statute, passed in 1865, allocated a small number of peremptory 
challenges to the prosecution,
209
 with more for the defense.
210
 While a 
symmetrical allocation of peremptory challenges was considered during 
the drafting of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the proposal was 
rejected,
211
 and ever since those Rules came into effect in 1946, they have 
allocated more peremptory challenges to the defense than to the 
prosecution in non-capital felonies.
212
 Once states began devising their 
own statutory allocations, they typically awarded them only to criminal 
defendants.
213
 By 1870, almost all states allocated some peremptory 
 
 
 207. Id. at 148. Some states continued to authorize “standing aside,” however. Id. at 149. 
 208. This statute awarded peremptory challenges to the defense in trials for treason and other 
offenses punishable by death. See Morgan v. Commonwealth, 189 S.W.3d 99, 128 (Ky. 2006) 
(Cooper, J., dissenting) (“In 1790, Congress enacted An Act for Punishment of Certain Crimes Against 
the United States, ch. 9, § 30, 1 Stat. 119 (1790), which explicitly afforded the defendant thirty-five 
peremptory challenges if charged with treason and twenty if charged with any other capital offense. 
No provision was made either for peremptory strikes by the prosecution or for the common law 
practice of ‘standing aside.’”), overruled by Shane v. Commonwealth, 243 S.W.3d 336 (Ky. 2007). 
There is some indication that prosecutorial challenges were permitted in trials not covered by the act, 
and even that some were permitted in trials that were covered by the act. See United States v. 
Marchant, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 480, 483 (1827) (asserting in dictum that “standing aside” had been 
inherited as common law from England); but see United States v. Shackleford, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 588, 
590 (1855) (clarifying that “standing aside” was not rooted in federal common law). 
 209. Bloom, supra note 205, at 651 (“In 1865, Congress provided for a small number of 
prosecutor peremptories in federal criminal trials—and many states followed suit.”); Note, Due 
Process Limits on Prosecutorial Peremptory Challenges, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1013, 1033 n.129 (1989) 
(“[W]hen Congress first provided for peremptories, it gave them only to defendants. Although courts 
implied a government right of peremptory challenge, Congress did not grant one by statute until 
1865.”). 
 210. See Orfield, supra note 196, at 95 (noting that in capital cases the defendant was given 
twenty and the government five, whereas in other cases the defendant was given ten and the 
government two).  
 211. See id. at 44 (discussing initial draft of Federal Rules that provided that “[t]he number of 
peremptory challenges which will be permitted to the defendant or his attorney and the number which 
shall be permitted to the defendant shall be the same”). 
 212. See id. at 53 (“If the offense was punishable by imprisonment for more than one year the 
government was to have six challenges but the defendant or defendants jointly were to have ten.”); 
FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(b)(2) (in non-capital felony cases, “[t]he government has 6 peremptory challenges 
and the defendant or defendants jointly have 10 peremptory challenges”). 
 213. See Goldwasser, supra note 72, at at 828. Some state courts held that the prosecution’s right 
to the “standing aside” procedure as to some jurors survived these statutes; others held the opposite. 
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challenges to the prosecution,
214
 but these early statutes typically awarded 
a smaller number to the prosecution than to the defense.
215
 
2. Contemporary Methods of Allocation 
Currently, each state fixes the number of peremptory challenges 
available to each side by statute,
216
 procedural rule,
217
 or both.
218
 While 
peremptory challenges are not constitutionally required,
219
 every state 
allocates a certain number of peremptory challenges to the defense and a 
certain number to the prosecution.
220
 The number of peremptory 
challenges allocated frequently varies according to the seriousness of the 
charge.
221
 A particular state may allocate a symmetrical number of 
peremptory challenges for one type of charge (misdemeanors, for 
example), while allocating an asymmetrical number for another type of 
charge (felonies, or capital felonies, for example).
222
  
 
 
 214. See Hoffman, supra note 200, at 827 & n.93 (noting that “the slave states were first to enact 
statutes giving the peremptory challenge to the prosecution, with Alabama and Georgia leading the 
way in 1802 and 1833, respectively”) There were holdouts, however. See VAN DYKE, supra note 73, at 
148–49 (“The two most populous states, New York and Virginia, both denied the prosecution any 
peremptory challenges for most of the nineteenth century.”). 
 215. See Goldwasser, supra note 72, at 828 (“Even after statutes began to allow prosecution 
peremptories, most jurisdictions gave a greater number of peremptories to the defense.”); VAN DYKE, 
supra note 73, at 167 (“It would clearly not be revolutionary to deprive the prosecution of its right to 
challenge without explanation. The two most populous states in the first century of this country’s 
existence operated under such a system. New York, which had abolished the standing aside privilege 
by statute in 1786, did not accord the state peremptory challenge rights until 1881. The state of 
Virginia, which never recognized the practice of standing aside, did not allow the prosecution 
peremptory challenges until 1919.”) When Maryland was founded as a colony, only the defendant was 
afforded peremptory challenges: thirty-five in cases of treason and twenty in other felony cases. See 
Booze v. State, 698 A.2d 1087, 1091 (Md. 1997). It was “not until 1860 that the State was allowed 
peremptory challenges in criminal cases, and then only in Baltimore City, where it was allowed five.” 
Id. 
 216. See, e.g., 1982 Ala. Acts No. 82-221, 267 (establish“one-for-one strikes in criminal cases”). 
 217. See, e.g., KY. R. CRIM. P. 9.40(1). 
 218. See, e.g., 1995 Tenn. Pub. Acts 339, § 1 (equalizing the number of peremptory challenges in 
all types of offense); TENN. R. CRIM. P. 24(e) (allocating equal numbers of peremptory challenges to 
prosecution and defense). 
 219. See supra notes 200–01 and accompanying text. 
 220. See Hoffman, supra note 200, at 827 (“Today, every state recognizes some form of 
peremptory challenges for both sides in criminal and civil cases.”). 
 221. See, e.g., DEL. CT. C.P.R. 24 (in capital cases, twelve for prosecution, and twenty for defense; 
otherwise symmetrical). 
 222. See, e.g., id. 
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3. Trend Toward Symmetry 
In the decade before Batson, twenty states, in addition to the federal 
system, allocated peremptory challenges in an asymmetrical fashion, with 
more allocated to the defense than the prosecution with respect to at least 
some types of charges.
223
 The consistent trend since then, however, has 
been toward symmetry,
224
 and the number of jurisdictions espousing some 
form of asymmetry has decreased by more than fifty percent, to nine states 
 
 
 223. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(b) (in non-capital felonies, six for prosecution and ten for defense); 
ALA. CODE tit. 30 § 60 (1980) (“struck jury” system, in which the defendant removes two jurors from 
the list for each one removed by the government); ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 24 (in felonies, six for 
prosecution and ten for defense); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-33-305 (1936) (in capital cases, ten for 
prosecution and twelve for defense; in non-capital felonies, six for prosecution and eight for defense); 
DEL. SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 24; DEL. CT. C.P.R. 24 (in capital cases, twelve for prosecution, and twenty 
for defense); GA. CODE ANN. § 15-12-165 (1982) (in capital cases, ten for prosecution and twenty for 
defense; in non-capital felonies, six for prosecution and twelve for defense; in misdemeanors, six for 
prosecution and twelve for defense); KY. R. CRIM. P. 9.40 (1978) (in capital cases, five for prosecution 
and eight for defense; in non-capital felonies, five for prosecution and eight for defense); ME. REV. 
STAT. tit. 15, § 1258 (1980); ME. R. CRIM. P. 24(3) (1983) (in murder cases, ten for prosecution and 
twenty for defense); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 4-313 (West 1984) (in capital cases, ten for 
prosecution and twenty for defense); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 768.12, 768.13 (West 1982) (in 
capital cases, fifteen for prosecution and twenty for defense); MINN. R. CRIM. P. 26.02(6) (in capital 
cases, nine for prosecution and fifteen for defense; in non-capital felonies, three for prosecution and 
five for defense); MO. REV. STAT. §§ 546.180 (asymmetry in all types of offense); 1933 Neb. Laws 
243 (in cases where “the offense is punishable with death or imprisonment for life,” ten for 
prosecution and twelve for defense); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 606:3, 606:4 (2014) (in capital cases 
other than first-degree murder, ten for prosecution and twenty for defense); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2B:23-
13 (West 2007) (in capital cases, twelve for prosecution, twenty for defense); N.M. DIST. CT. R. CIV. 
P. 5-606 (in capital cases, eight for prosecution and twelve for defense; in non-capital felonies, three 
for prosecution and five for defense; in misdemeanors, three for prosecution and five for defense); 
N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 15A-1217 (West 1977) (moving the state from unequal to equal allocations); 
OR. REV. STAT. § 136.230 (1981) (in capital cases, six for prosecution and twelve for defense; in non-
capital felonies, three for prosecution and six for defense; in misdemeanors, three for prosecution and 
six for defense); S.C. CODE ANN. § 14-7-1110 (1976) (in capital cases, five for prosecution and ten for 
defense); TENN. R. CRIM. P. 24(d) (in capital cases, eight for the prosecution and fifteen for the 
defense; in non-capital felonies, four for the prosecution and eight for the defense); W. VA. R. CRIM. P. 
24(b); W. VA. CODE § 62-3-3 (2014) (in capital cases, two for the prosecution and six for the defense; 
in non-capital felonies, two for the prosecution and six for the defense).  
 224. This trend has involved eleven states moving to symmetry between 1977 and 2006. It appears 
to have been fueled by the recommendations of two national organizations in the 1970s. See NAT’L 
ADVISORY COMM’N ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND GOALS, REPORT ON THE COURTS 100 
(1973) (“[R]egardless of the number of peremptory challenges allocated to the defense, the 
prosecution should be allowed to exercise an equal number. Unless the prosecution is afforded this 
opportunity, the defense has an unjustifiable opportunity to select a jury biased in its own behalf.”); 
NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, UNIFORM RULES, Rule 512(d) (1974) 
(“Each side is entitled to . . . peremptory challenges.”); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 15A-1217 (West 
1977) (Editor’s Note stating that the equalization was done to “follow[] the lead” of these 
organizations). An earlier group of twenty-seven states moved to symmetry between 1854 and 1939: 
Rhode Island, Colorado, Illinois, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Idaho, Iowa, Nevada, Florida, Vermont, 
Texas, Pennsylvania, Connecticut, South Dakota, Wisconsin, Virginia, Washington, Montana, 
California, North Dakota, Ohio, Louisiana, Arizona, Hawaii, Kansas, Wyoming, and New York.  
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plus the federal system.
225
 Further, in two of the states whose allocations 
are currently asymmetrical—South Carolina and West Virginia—the past 
year saw legislative proposals to move from asymmetry to symmetry.
226
 In 
two additional states—Minnesota and New Jersey—earlier unsuccessful 
efforts were made to erase the asymmetry.
227
 Repeated efforts to obtain 
symmetry have also been made in the federal system.
228
  
The state in which Batson originated—Kentucky—provides a good 
example of the general trend. In that state more than any other, there might 
have been concern about broad prosecutorial allocation of peremptory 
challenges. However, the trend toward symmetry has been constant.
229
 
 
 
 225. Since the 1970s, asymmetry has been abandoned in Alabama, Alaska, Georgia, Kentucky, 
Maine, Michigan, Missouri, Nebraska, North Carolina, Oregon, and Tennessee. See 1982 Ala. Acts 
No. 82-221, 267 (“establish[ing] one-for-one strikes in criminal cases”); ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 24 
(Editor’s Notes to SCO 1204: “The provision granting ten peremptory challenges to each side [for 
felonies] was added by ch. 117 § 1 SLA 1994.”); 2005 Ga. Laws, Act 8, § 7 (same number for each 
side in misdemeanor, felony, and death penalty cases); KY. R. CRIM. P. 9.40(1) (same number for each 
side in both felony and misdemeanor cases); Order Amending Rules of Civil Procedure, Rules of 
Criminal Procedure, Rules of Supreme Court, 94-1, at 8 (eff. Oct. 1, 1994); ME. R. CRIM. P. 24(c)(3) 
(same number for each side in all kinds of cases); 1 CLUCHEY & SEITZINGER, supra note 24, at 24-6.1 
(quoting Advisory Committee Note relating to 1991 Amendment, which stated that “[t]he Advisory 
Committee sees no reason to continue the practice of giving to a defendant in a murder case twice as 
many peremptory challenges as are given to the state”); MICH. R. CRIM. P. 6.412(E)(2) (equalizing the 
peremptory challenges for defense and prosecution); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 768.13 (West 2006) 
(same, in order “to conform [the Code of Criminal Procedure] with current court rules”); MO. REV. 
STAT. § 494.480 (1979); 1981 Neb. Laws LB 213, § 1 (twelve peremptory challenges for each side in 
cases where “the offense is punishable with death or imprisonment for life”); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 15A-1217 (West 1977); OR. REV. STAT. § 136.230 (1987) (in trials involving charges “punishable 
with imprisonment in . . . the penitentiary for life” or “capital offense[s],” twelve peremptory 
challenges for each side; six for each side in all other cases); 1995 Tenn. Pub. Acts 339, § 1 
(equalizing the number of peremptory challenges in all types of offense); TENN. R. CRIM. P. 24(e) 
(amended in 2006 to conform the rule to TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-18-118).  
 226. See H.B. 3188, 2013–14 Leg., 120th Sess. (S.C. 2014) (a bill to equalize the number of 
peremptory challenges for the defendant and the state in a criminal case); S.B. 0270, 2013–14 Leg., 
120th Sess. (S.C. 2014); S.B. 87, 2013 Leg., Reg. Sess. (W. Va. 2014) (changing the number of 
challenges in jury selection in felony cases); H.B. 2892, 2013 Leg., Reg. Sess. (W. Va. 2014). 
 227. See State v. Dolan, No. C5-99-86, 1999 WL 1011967, at *6 (Minn. Ct. App. Nov. 9, 1999); 
Symposium, A Matter of Life and Death: New Jersey’s Death Penalty Statute in the 21st Century, 23 
SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 249, 275 (1999) (remarks of The Honorable Richard A. Zimmer). 
 228. See Goldwasser, supra note 72, at 828 n.118 (“In 1977, the Supreme Court proposed a 
change that would have equalized the number of challenges in all federal criminal proceedings, but 
Congress rejected the proposal.”); Judith Heinz, Peremptory Challenges in Criminal Cases: A 
Comparison of Regulation in the United States, England, and Canada, 16 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. 
L.J. 201, 216 n.84 (1993) (“Several new crime control bills are currently pending in the United States 
Congress, all of which would reduce the number of peremptory challenges accorded defendants from 
10 to 6, thereby equalizing, in federal cases, the number of peremptory challenges available to the 
defense and prosecution.”); William T. Pizzi & Morris B. Hoffman, Jury Selection Errors on Appeal, 
38 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1391, 1415 n.123 (2001) (mentioning efforts to make the federal allocation 
symmetrical in 1976, 1990, and 1998). 
 229. See Morgan v. Commonwealth, 189 S.W.3d 99, 138 (Ky. 2006) (Cooper, J., dissenting), 
overruled by Shane v. Commonwealth, 243 S.W.3d 336 (Ky. 2007). 
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Prior to 1854, the defense received twenty peremptory challenges and the 
prosecution none.
230
 In 1854, the allocation was changed to twenty and 
five,
231
 in 1893 to fifteen and five,
232
 in 1978 to eight and five,
233
 and in 
1994, eight years after Batson, to eight and eight.
234
 
Efforts to equalize the allocation of peremptory challenges are 
explained on the basis that there is no apparent justification—other than 
attempting to give an unfair advantage to the defense—for maintaining 
asymmetry.
235
 State legislators and members of the executive admit to 
ignorance about the historical picture
236
 and bafflement about the current 
need for these provisions. In New Jersey, for example, one state legislator 
stated, in support of a proposal to equalize the number of peremptory 
challenges, that “no one has been able to explain to me why there should 
be this disparity, other than that you want to give advantage to the 
defense.”
237
 The next Subpart provides that missing explanation. 
B. Maintaining Asymmetry in Peremptory Allocations  
This Subpart proposes that the trend toward symmetrical allocation of 
peremptory challenges should be halted, and, where possible, reversed. 
Part II laid out some of the asymmetries that justify this approach. This 
Subpart lays out three additional justifications. First, asymmetry does not 
equate to unfairness and, indeed, has been a foundational component of 
 
 
 230. See id. 
 231. See id. 
 232. See id. 
 233. See id. 
 234. See id. 
 235. See Symposium, supra note 227, at 276 (remarks of The Honorable Richard A. Zimmer); 1 
CLUCHEY & SEITZINGER, supra note 24, at 24-6.1 (quoting Advisory Committee Note relating to 1991 
Amendment to the Rules of Criminal Procedure, which stated that “[t]he Advisory Committee sees no 
reason to continue the practice of giving to a defendant in a murder case twice as many peremptory 
challenges as are given to the state”). 
 236. See Hearing on S.B. 353 Before the H. Comm. on State Affairs, supra note 24 
(“Representative Ulmer inquired whether or not [a proposed bill designed to bring about symmetry] 
was similar to how the law was previously in the state of Alaska. She assumed at one point there had 
been an equal number and it was changed. If so, why was it changed and why is it being changed back. 
Chairman Vezey answered . . . [that] [t]he legal history of the change . . . went too far back for him to 
have knowledge of. . . . Margot Knuth, Assistant Attorney General, Department of Law, answered 
Representative Ulmer’s question. . . . [She] did not know why the discrepancy had existed for so many 
years.”). 
 237. Symposium, supra note 227, at 276 (remarks of The Honorable Richard A. Zimmer); see 
also 1 CLUCHEY & SEITZINGER, supra note 24, at 24-6.1 (quoting Advisory Committee Note relating 
to 1991 Amendment to the Rules of Criminal Procedure, which stated that “[t]he Advisory Committee 
sees no reason to continue the practice of giving to a defendant in a murder case twice as many 
peremptory challenges as are given to the state”). 
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efforts to create a fair criminal justice system. Second, asymmetrical 
allocation of peremptory challenges offers particular opportunities with 
respect to the difficulties of the Batson doctrine. Finally, asymmetrical 
allocation has potential value beyond the context of the peremptory 
challenge and Batson, in that it provides a concrete example of resistance 
to a troubling trend toward symmetry that is seeping into various aspects 
of criminal justice. 
1. Asymmetry in Service of Fairness 
The notion of asymmetry in the allocation of peremptory challenges 
may be anathema to those for whom the notion of Justice, and her pair of 
scales, suggests that both sides in a trial must be treated equally in all 
respects.
238
 Yet an examination of some of the core structures of the 
criminal justice system reveals that asymmetry is a central component of 
the system’s design and of its attempts to achieve fairness. 
The Constitution is of course asymmetrical, in that it guarantees rights 
to the defendant rather than the prosecution.
239
 Thus one sees in the text of 
the Constitution that the defendant—and not the prosecution
240
—has the 
right to an impartial jury,
241
 the right to confront adverse witnesses,
242
 and 
the right not to be compelled to be a witness against him or herself.
243
 
Constitutional doctrine also provides that the defendant has the right to be 
presumed innocent unless and until proven guilty under the highly 
asymmetrical “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard;
244
 greater access than 
 
 
 238. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 107 (1986) (Marshall, J., concurring) (quoting Hayes 
v. Missouri, 120 U.S. 68, 70 (1887)) (rejecting notion that peremptory challenges should be prohibited 
for the prosecution but not the defense, on the basis that “[o]ur criminal justice system ‘requires not 
only freedom from any bias against the accused, but also from any prejudice against his prosecution. 
Between him and the state the scales are to be evenly held’”).  
 239. See Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 68 (1992) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“The concept 
that the government alone must honor constitutional dictates . . . is a fundamental tenet of our legal 
order, not an obstacle to be circumvented. This is particularly so in the context of criminal trials, where 
we have held the prosecution to uniquely high standards of conduct.” (citing Brady v. Maryland, 373 
U.S. 83 (1963); Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78 (1935))); Barbara Flagg & Katherine 
Goldwasser, Fighting for Truth, Justice, and the Asymmetrical Way, 76 WASH. U. L.Q. 105, 109–11 
(1998). 
 240. See Susan Bandes, Taking Some Rights Too Seriously: The State’s Right to a Fair Trial, 60 
S. CAL. L. REV. 1019, 1019 (1987) (“Although an argument might be made that the state possesses 
rights, that argument would be difficult to support. Yet courts ascribing rights to the state do not even 
attempt to support their facile assumption.”). 
 241. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 242. See id. 
 243. See U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 244. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 372 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) (“[T]he requirement of 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt in a criminal case . . . [is] bottomed on a fundamental value 
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the prosecution to pretrial discovery,
245
 including a right to the production 
of favorable material;
246
 greater ability to appeal the outcome of a criminal 
case, thanks to the protections of double jeopardy;
247
 and, because of the 
federal unanimous verdict requirement,
248
 an ability—not shared by the 
prosecution—to “win” on the basis of just one juror vote.
249
 
In addition to the constitutional allocation of rights, so also the roles of 
defense and prosecution are designed to be asymmetrical. The defense is 
to strive for acquittals, or the next best alternative, and is not obliged to 
seek other objectives.
250
 The prosecution, however, is supposed to aim at 
objectives other than obtaining convictions. It is not for the prosecutor to 
tack “as many skins of victims as possible to the wall.”
251
 Rather, the 
prosecutor has a distinct ethical (and constitutional) duty to “seek 
justice,”
252
 which means something other than merely duking it out with 
an adversary.
253
  
These asymmetries in rights and roles demonstrate that in the design of 
the criminal justice system there has been recognition that asymmetry may 
be the best route to fairness. This recognition has been obscured in the 
discussion of peremptory challenges. Representatives of state executives 
and the state judiciary frequently invoke the notions of “restoring 
balance”
254
 and bringing about a “level playing field”
255
 in support of a 
 
 
determination of our society that it is far worse to convict an innocent man than to let a guilty man go 
free.”); Richard D. Friedman, An Asymmetrical Approach to the Problem of Peremptories?, 28 CRIM. 
L. BULL. 507, 518–19 (1992) (“Blackstone’s statement that it is better to let ten guilty defendants go 
free than to convict one innocent person may be a cliché, but it only became a cliché because it 
expresses a fundamental value. The principal expression of that value in our criminal law system is the 
standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt . . . .”). 
 245. See Mark A. Esqueda, Note, Michigan Strives to Balance the Adversarial Process and Seek 
the Truth with Its New Reciprocal Criminal Discovery Rule, 74 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 317, 325 
(1997). 
 246. See Richardson, supra note 142, at 357 (“Generally, defense lawyers are not required to 
disclose evidence favorable to the prosecution’s case or to inform the government of their client’s 
guilt.”). 
 247. These protections prevent the prosecution from appealing an acquittal. See Fong Foo v. 
United States, 369 U.S. 141 (1962). 
 248. See Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 362 (1972).  
 249. See Hoffman, supra note 200, at 852 n.193 (“[A] hung jury is ordinarily considered a victory 
for the defense . . . .”). 
 250. See Howard, supra note 201, at 372. 
 251. Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 648–49 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
 252. See AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 142, § 3-1.2 (“The duty of the prosecutor is to seek justice, 
not merely to convict.”). 
 253. See id. 
 254. See Press Release, Office of the Governor of Ga., Governor Perdue Signs Criminal Justice 
Act of 2005 (Apr. 5, 2005), available at http://sonnyperdue.georgia.gov/00/press/detail/0,2668,780 
06749_79688147_93022154,00.html (“‘The Criminal Justice Act of 2005 revises provisions in 
Georgia’s criminal law that restore balance in the prosecution of criminal cases,’ said Governor Sonny 
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push for symmetry in the allocation of the peremptory challenge. 
Dissenting voices do occasionally pipe up in these discussions. For 
example, when Alaskan legislators considered a bill that would equalize 
the number of peremptory challenges, defense attorneys tried to point out 
that, because of some of the disparities described in this Article, 
asymmetrical peremptory challenge allocations were the best route to a 
level playing field.
 256
 Those arguments were unsuccessful,
257
 but they 
should be given more prominence. 
 2. Benefits of Asymmetry in the Context of the Peremptory Challenge  
While the proposal to resist symmetry in the allocation of peremptory 
challenges may appear to be a modest approach to some of the problems 
laid out in this Article, it presents significant opportunities. Subpart 3 will 
lay out the opportunities that it creates beyond the context of the 
peremptory challenge. This Subpart lays out the opportunities that it 
creates in the peremptory challenge context, some of which stem from its 
apparent modesty. 
It is true that the proposal is in some ways modest. It takes a 
conservative approach, in that it seeks to return the peremptory challenge 
to its asymmetrical roots. It does not call for the ultimate asymmetry, 
namely abolition of the prosecutorial peremptory challenge. It also does 
 
 
Perdue.”); OR. REV. STAT. § 136.230 (1987) (“By this measure we seek to secure balanced justice by 
eliminating unbalanced rules.”). 
 255. See Morgan v. Commonwealth, 189 S.W.3d 99, 138 (Ky. 2006) (Cooper, J., dissenting) 
(describing the motivation for abandoning asymmetry in that state as a “gradual[] recogni[tion] that in 
criminal cases, as has always been true in civil cases, there should be a level playing field between 
prosecution and defense”), overruled by Shane v. Commonwealth, 243 S.W.3d 336 (Ky. 2007); 
Peremptory Challenge for Jurors: Hearing on S.B. 353 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 1993–
94 Leg., 18th Sess. (Alaska 1994) (committee minutes) (Assistant Attorney General endorsing 
proposed move to symmetry because “it is appropriate to level the playing field”); Hearing on S.B. 
353 Before the H. Comm. on State Affairs, supra note 24 (An Assistant Attorney General “did not care 
what the number [of peremptory challenges] was as long as there was a level playing field.”). 
 256. Alaska’s Deputy Public Defender tried to raise this point before the State Senate Judiciary 
Committee, stating that “she does not believe that the goals of the bill, to level the playing [field] and 
to save time and money, will be satisfied by passage of the legislation. She said when selecting 
[prospective] jurors, the goal is to get fair jurors, so the number being allocated on the defense side is 
recognition of the fact that we don’t start out evenly, that many people come into the court room with 
preconceived ideas and that it is necessary to give extra peremptory challenges in order to make sure 
that the presumption of innocence is followed by everyone in the court room.” Hearing on S.B. 353 
Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, supra note 255. These sentiments were echoed by an attorney 
who testified before the same committee to the effect that “the playing field is relatively level right 
now and by changing it to six and six would make it a lot less even than it is right now and make it an 
unfair process. . . . [since] most people think that most criminal defendants are guilty when they walk 
in the room.” Id.  
 257. See ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 24 (symmetrical allocation). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
1542 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 92:1503 
 
 
 
 
not call for changes to the Batson doctrine. In the view voiced by one 
recent judicial opinion, it would therefore fall into the category of “half-
measures”
258
: mere efforts to reduce the harms associated with the 
prosecutorial peremptory challenge. 
There are, however, practical reasons for taking this apparently modest 
approach. Abolition of the prosecutorial peremptory challenge is a 
measure that has both historical precedent and contemporary adherents,
259
 
but despite its theoretical appeal, it seems unlikely as a practical matter.
260
 
Prosecutors, like other litigators, appear to be addicted to the peremptory 
challenge
261
 and are ready and able to lobby for its retention.
262
 Reforming 
the Batson doctrine is also far from an easy task. The state courts have 
been given twenty-eight years of flexibility in their implementation of it,
263
 
 
 
 258. State v. Saintcalle, 309 P.3d 326, 348 (Wash. 2013) (González, J., concurring) (“There are 
half-measures that may reduce the amount of bias in the jury selection process, such as tighter control 
of questioning based on the federal court model or reduction of the number of peremptory challenges 
that may be exercised.”). 
 259. See, e.g., Abbe Smith, A Call to Abolish Peremptory Challenges by Prosecutors, 27 GEO. J. 
LEGAL ETHICS 1163 (2014); Ogletree, supra note 113, at 1148 (“There is ample historical precedent 
for the allotment of peremptories to defendants but not to the government.”). 
 260. See Baldus et al., supra note 116, at 129 (“Judicial abolition . . . seems unlikely, as the United 
States Supreme Court and most state and federal courts appear content with the symbolic compromise 
they have created. The prospects of abolition by State legislatures seem equally unlikely.”). 
 261. See Georgia Wilemon, Book Review, 8 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 209, 210 (1998) (reviewing 
SUSAN ESTRICH, GETTING AWAY WITH MURDER: HOW POLITICS IS DESTROYING THE CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE SYSTEM (1998)) (“[S]ince both prosecutors and criminal defense lawyers would fight strongly 
to save them in their respective state legislatures, the proposal to end peremptory challenges is not 
practical.”). 
 262. See Rhea Arledge, Number of Peremptory Challenges Provided to the Prosecution and 
Defense, Parity vs. Disparity, THE PROSECUTOR, Mar./Apr. 2003, at 16, 16, 45 (decrying asymmetrical 
arrangements, on the grounds that “[t]he very procedure developed and intended to ensure that a fair 
and impartial jury is selected is often times applied to the prosecution, responsible for representing the 
people of the community, and the defense in an unfair manner,” and stating that “[i]t is imperative that 
prosecutors lobby for changes in court rules and state statutes that currently promote this inequality”); 
Donald A. Dripps, Criminal Procedure, Footnote Four, and the Theory of Public Choice; or, Why 
Don’t Legislatures Give a Damn About the Rights of the Accused?, 44 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1079, 1091 
(1993) (“Police and prosecutors face performance evaluations, and their performance is, perhaps 
understandably, judged by measuring the offenses cleared and convictions won, rather than by any 
positive changes in the rate of crime. It follows that these bureaucracies devote substantial effort to 
persuading legislators not to impose statutory restraints on their pursuit of these objectives.”); Adam 
M. Gershowitz, Raise the Proof: A Default Rule for Indigent Defense, 40 CONN. L. REV. 85, 120–21 
(2007) (“[L]egislatures are inclined to give prosecutors what they want because their interests are 
aligned. Just like prosecutors, legislators want to highlight convictions and punishment that occurred 
on their watch. Second, legislators will listen to district attorneys’ demands because they will fear the 
consequences. Prosecutors frequently seek higher office, and the failure of legislators to eliminate 
obstacles to convicting defendants will provide a good campaign issue for the district attorneys.”); 
Richard Lempert, The Economic Analysis of Evidence Law: Common Sense on Stilts, 87 VA. L. REV. 
1619, 1627–28 (2001) (“When prosecutors scream loudly, they are usually heard by legislators.”). 
 263. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 97 (1986) (“We have confidence that trial judges, 
experienced in supervising voir dire, will be able to decide if the circumstances concerning the 
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and no winning solution has emerged. Indeed, a recent report into the 
implementation of Batson indicates that in many cases, state courts have 
undermined, rather than strengthened, its protections.
264
 Courts 
considering adjustments to the Batson doctrine face tremendous new 
challenges, including whether and how a doctrine limited to protection 
against purposeful discrimination might be modified in order to take 
account of the growing data on implicit bias,
265
 and whether and how they 
might respond to the Ninth Circuit’s decision to recognize sexual 
orientation as a prohibited basis for peremptory challenges.
266
 This 
Article’s proposal is easier to effect than abolition or doctrinal change.
267
 
It aims to reduce the harm threatened by the prosecutorial peremptory 
challenge, while the Batson doctrine continues to evolve.
268
 If the 
peremptory challenge is indeed an addiction, harm reduction may be the 
most feasible approach.
269
 
 
 
prosecutor’s use of peremptory challenges creates a prima facie case of discrimination against black 
jurors.”). 
 264. See EQUAL JUSTICE INITIATIVE, supra note 56, at 26; see also Ogletree, supra note 113, at 
1105 (“Without clear direction from the Supreme Court as to its application, state and lower federal 
courts have interpreted the commands of Batson and its progeny differently and, in many cases, these 
interpretations have undermined the protection Batson was meant to offer.”). 
 265. See Montoya, supra note 60, at 1024 (“Batson also fails to recognize that much 
discrimination in jury selection, like discrimination generally, is the product of unconscious racism and 
sexism.”). 
 266. See SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Abbott Labs., 740 F.3d 471 (9th Cir. 2014); see also State 
v. Saintcalle, 309 P.3d 326, 360 (Wash. 2013) (González, J., concurring) (“[I]t remains unclear exactly 
which groups are to be protected from discrimination in jury selection.”). 
 267. See Ogletree, supra note 113, at 1149 (pointing out the ease with which the legislative 
allocation of peremptory challenges could be altered). 
 268. See Robert William Rodriguez, Note, Batson v. Kentucky: Equal Protection, the Fair Cross-
Section Requirement, and the Discriminatory Use of Peremptory Challenges, 37 EMORY L.J. 755, 793 
(1988) (“With a reduction in the number of challenges that counsel could exercise, the peremptory 
challenge could return to its fundamental nature as arbitrary and capricious. Lacking the capability to 
systematically exclude all members of a single race from the petit jury, the urgent need for judicial 
review of the exercise of such challenges would be reduced significantly.”); Baldus et al., supra note 
116, at 130 (proposing the introduction in Pennsylvania of asymmetry, with the prosecution given five 
and the defense ten peremptories, on the grounds that this “would have significantly reduced race and 
gender discrimination and limited its adverse impact on the jury decision making system” and adding 
that “[i]f peremptories are critical to protect each side against truly oddball jurors, then fewer than five 
strikes should be enough”). 
 269. See Ernest Drucker, Drug Law, Mass Incarceration, and Public Health, 91 OR. L. REV. 1097, 
1099 (2013) (recommending harm reduction approach to drug use); Baldus et al., supra note 116, at 
121 (“[A] dramatic reduction in the number of strikes available to each side, plus a larger share for 
defense counsel (10 vs. 5) would also eliminate the adverse effects of overly aggressive strike 
strategies by the two sides. And even though this alternative contemplates the continued influence of 
race and gender as substantial factors in the use of peremptories, the significant reduction in the 
number of authorized strikes would limit their possible damage. Also, the two-to-one advantage for 
defense counsel would offset somewhat the comparative advantage the Commonwealth currently 
enjoys in the competition to influence jury composition.”). 
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Even though the approach may appear modest, the effects could be 
significant. First, reducing the number of prosecutorial peremptory strikes 
would help combat one of the ways in which lower court implementation 
has weakened the Batson doctrine. One common justification for rejecting 
a Batson challenge is that the prosecution had a number of peremptory 
challenges left over that were not used to remove others on the jury who 
share the same protected characteristics as those whose removal is being 
queried.
270
 This argument is often used to support a finding that the party 
bringing the Batson challenge has failed even to make out a prima facie 
case of discrimination.
271
 This argument, which the Supreme Court itself 
has rejected,
272
 would be harder to mount were the prosecution’s 
peremptory allocation to be reduced. Second, significant trial reform could 
be achieved. As one state Attorney General put it, “this type of nuts and 
bolts legislation can really make a difference in an extraordinary number 
of cases.”
273
  
3. Benefits of Asymmetry Beyond the Context of the Peremptory 
Challenge  
This Subpart points out that resisting asymmetry in the peremptory 
challenge context has broader benefits, in that it helps reveal and reinforce 
the notion that throughout our criminal justice system asymmetry has been 
key to fairness. It also shows that the erosion of asymmetries that have 
been foundational to the structure of the criminal justice system needs to 
be scrutinized. The erosion of such asymmetries contributes to a public 
perception of the criminal justice system that fails to grasp its fundamental 
asymmetry. The trends in both perception and reality need to be resisted. 
 
 
 270. See Douglas L. Colbert, Challenging the Challenge: Thirteenth Amendment as a Prohibition 
Against the Racial Use of Peremptory Challenges, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 95 n.466 (1990) (“Since 
Batson was decided, some courts have rejected a defendant’s equal protection argument and showing 
of a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination, and have not required a prosecutor to provide a 
‘neutral reason’ when the prosecutor allowed some black jurors to serve on the trial jury.”); EQUAL 
JUSTICE INITIATIVE, supra note 56, at 26; Roberts, supra note 111, at 1394–96 (citing cases). 
 271. See Colbert, supra note 270, at 95 n.466. 
 272. See Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 240–41, 250 (2005) (“This late-stage decision to 
accept a black panel member willing to impose a death sentence does not . . . neutralize the early-stage 
decision to challenge a comparable venireman . . . . In fact, if the prosecutors were going to accept any 
black juror to obscure the otherwise consistent pattern of opposition to seating one, the time to do so 
was getting late.”). 
 273. Peremptory Challenge of Jurors: Hearing on S.B. 353 Before the S. Comm. on State Affairs, 
1993–94 Leg., 18th Sess. (Alaska 1994) (committee minutes) (statement of Ed McNally, Deputy Att’y 
Gen., Dep’t of Law) (on whether to move to a symmetrical allocation of peremptory challenges). 
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a. Constitutional Rights  
Each of the areas of constitutional asymmetry identified in Subpart 1 
has been subject to incursions. In an era in which plea bargains are by far 
the most common means by which convictions are garnered,
274
 all of the 
trial-related rights held up as foundational examples of asymmetry—rights 
to an impartial jury, to confront witnesses, to proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt, to a unanimous verdict—typically become moot.
275
 The plea 
involves no jury, no confrontation, no verdict, and no requirement of proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt:
276
 the standard of proof required for the 
acceptance of a plea is no higher than probable cause.
277
 It is also 
constitutionally permissible for plea bargains to include waivers of other 
traditionally asymmetrical protections, such as the right to appeal,
278
 the 
right to exculpatory material,
279
and the right to any pre-plea discovery.
280
 
Even when a trial does occur, threats to foundational asymmetries are 
apparent. First, the provision of pretrial discovery is increasingly required 
of the defense, rather than just the prosecution.
281
 Second, several states 
have established provisions permitting non-unanimous jury verdicts, thus 
 
 
 274. See Michael T. Cahill, Retributive Justice in the Real World, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 815, 853 
(2007) (“Well over ninety percent of cases are resolved with guilty pleas, almost all of which involve 
plea bargains . . . .”). 
 275. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(1)(F) (requiring the court, before accepting a plea of guilty, to 
advise the defendant of the trial rights that are waived if the court accepts the plea). 
 276. See Darryl K. Brown, American Prosecutors’ Powers and Obligations in the Era of Plea 
Bargaining, in THE PROSECUTOR IN TRANSNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 200, 204 (Erik Luna & Marianne 
L. Wade eds., 2012) (“[W]hen pleas replace trials, most of the systemic components of public 
adjudication that serve the objectives of factual reliability and accurate normative judgment are 
missing—the jury, evidentiary disclosure, rules of evidence, formal adversarial challenges to state 
evidence, and so on.”). 
 277. See Anna Roberts, Impeachment by Unreliable Conviction, 55 B.C. L. REV. 563, 580–81 & 
n.133 (2014) (pointing out the fallacy in the impeachment context that convictions rest on proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt and therefore can reliably be used to bring about the secondary hardship of 
impeachment by prior conviction). 
 278. See Alexandra W. Reimelt, Note, An Unjust Bargain: Plea Bargains and Waiver of the Right 
to Appeal, 51 B.C. L. REV. 871, 873 (2010) (“Increasingly, many criminal defendants are required to 
waive their right to appeal as a condition of the plea bargain.”).  
 279. See United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622 (2002). 
 280. See Erica Hashimoto, Toward Ethical Plea Bargaining, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 949, 949 
(2008) (“[P]rosecutors in some jurisdictions require as a condition of all pleas that defendants waive 
any rights they may have to pre-plea disclosures from the government.”). 
 281. Compare Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 81–82 (1970) (holding that the requirement that 
the defense give notice of alibi was not unconstitutional, particularly in light of the fact that the 
adversary system is not “a poker game,” but a “search for truth,” which is enhanced by giving each 
party equal access to the other side’s information), with id. at 111–14 (Black, J., dissenting) (claiming 
that majority failed to appreciate the importance of the defense’s constitutional rights to protection 
against state power, and that the parties were not on equal footing). See also Mary Prosser, Reforming 
Criminal Discovery: Why Old Objections Must Yield to New Realities, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 541, 577.  
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
1546 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 92:1503 
 
 
 
 
creating the possibility of conviction by majority.
282
 Finally, research into 
jurors’ attitudes, explicit and implicit, is raising questions about the extent 
to which the right to an impartial jury can be realized,
283
 and the extent to 
which jurors presume innocence unless and until the prosecution proves 
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
284
 
In at least one of these areas—the risk that implicit bias may be 
threatening both impartiality and the standard of proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt—courts have not yet made significant efforts to address 
the threats to asymmetry.
285
 The same may be true in the area of bias more 
generally.
286
 Courts and other decision makers should remain vigilant 
about each of these threats, lest distinctive components of our 
asymmetrical system continue to be quietly eroded.
287
 
b. Roles of Prosecution and Defense  
A second area where foundational asymmetry is under threat is in the 
respective roles of prosecution and defense. The theory was laid out 
above
288
: the prosecutor has a special role—and, indeed, special ethical 
rules.
289
 Whereas the defense attorney strives for acquittals or the next best 
alternative, and is not obliged to seek other objectives,
290
 it is not the 
prosecutor’s job solely to seek convictions. Rather, prosecutors have a 
distinct ethical (and constitutional) duty to “seek justice,”
291
 which means 
 
 
 282. Four states—Louisiana, Oregon, Idaho, and Oklahoma—currently permit non-unanimous 
verdicts in at least some criminal cases. See Kim Taylor-Thompson, Empty Votes in Jury Deliberation, 
113 HARV. L. REV. 1261, 1265 n.16 (2000). 
 283. See Levinson et al., supra note 96, at 190 (demonstrating that mock jurors “held strong 
associations between Black and Guilty, relative to White and Guilty, and [that] implicit associations 
predicted the way mock jurors evaluated ambiguous evidence”). 
 284. Jurors are commonly said to want to hear both sides of the story. See Roberts, supra note 
277, at 574 (“Despite the presumption of innocence, a defendant’s silence is generally thought to raise 
suspicions of guilt among jurors . . . .”); Massaro, supra note 176, at 518 n.102 (noting studies that 
suggest that sixty percent of prospective jurors reject the presumption of innocence). 
 285. See Roberts, supra note 27, at 862 (describing the absence of discussion on implicit bias in 
juror orientation materials). 
 286. See id. (noting that some jurisdictions’ juror orientation videos fail to mention bias at all). 
 287. See United States v. Werbrouck, 589 F.2d 273, 277 (7th Cir. 1978) (“A criminal conviction 
entails a finding of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in a forum which abides by specific rules of 
evidence and procedure designed to protect the defendant.”). 
 288. See supra Part III.B.1. 
 289. See AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 142, § 3-1.2; MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8 
(2014). 
 290. See Howard, supra note 201, at 372. 
 291. See AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 142, § 3-1.2 (“The duty of the prosecutor is to seek justice, 
not merely to convict.”). 
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something other than merely duking it out with an adversary.
292
 In 
practice, however, the incentive structure in prosecutors’ offices has 
helped to obscure these asymmetrical objectives,
293
 because what 
frequently “counts” for prosecutors is convictions.
294
 The foundational 
difference between the roles of prosecution and defense needs to be 
reinforced, lest the notion of “seeking justice” becomes, as Paul Butler 
fears it has already become, just “words on paper.”
295
 
c. Public Perception of the Criminal Justice System 
Perhaps as a result of these erosions of foundational asymmetries in 
rights and roles, one sees further threats to foundational asymmetries in 
public perceptions of the criminal justice system.  
On the issue of rights, for example, the notion that constitutional rights 
are accorded to the defendant, and not to either the prosecution or the 
alleged victim, is frequently obscured. One does not have to look further 
than the discussions about moving toward symmetrical allocation of 
peremptory challenges to see examples of a notion that rights not only 
exist on both sides but also are equal on both sides.
296
 Thus, for example, 
the Georgia Governor’s Office heralded the state’s move to symmetry, 
declaring that the abandoned asymmetry “g[ave] more rights to the 
 
 
 292. See id. 
 293. See Ferguson-Gilbert, supra note 149, at 289 (“‘The competitive and combative nature of 
modern adversary proceedings . . . has changed many prosecutors from champions of justice to 
advocates of victory.’” (citing JOSEPH F. LAWLESS, JR., PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT 23 (2d ed., 
Matthew Bender & Co. 1999) (1985))). 
 294. See Alschuler, supra note 90, at 647 (“[A]lthough it has often been contended that policemen 
‘count’ arrests and not convictions, the same thing cannot be said of prosecutors.”); Rachel E. Barkow, 
Organizational Guidelines for the Prosecutor’s Office, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 2089, 2091 (2010) 
(“[C]onvictions are the lodestar by which prosecutors tend to be judged.”); Fred C. Zacharias, 
Structuring the Ethics of Prosecutorial Trial Practice: Can Prosecutors Do Justice?, 44 VAND. L. 
REV. 45, 58–59 (1991) (“[B]ecause [a federal prosecutor’s] success is measured by her conviction rate, 
she may be tempted to ignore the rights of defendants, victims, or the community in order to obtain 
pleas or guilty verdicts.”). 
 295. Compare Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) (interest of government in a 
criminal prosecution “is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done”), with Paul Butler, 
Gideon’s Muted Trumpet, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 2013, at A21 (describing this statement, in the current 
system as “just words on paper”). 
 296. See Office of the Governor of Ga., supra note 254 (“‘The Criminal Justice Act of 2005 
revises provisions in Georgia’s criminal law that restore balance in the prosecution of criminal cases,’ 
said Governor Sonny Perdue. ‘With these changes to our criminal procedures, prosecutors will be 
better able to remove dangerous criminals from the streets and uphold the rights of crime victims, 
leading to a safer Georgia.’”). 
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defendant than to the victim.”
297
 Similarly, in Oregon, symmetry was 
enacted as the result of a “Crime Victims’ Bill of Rights,”
298
 in which “the 
people of the State of Oregon” declared “that victims of crime are entitled 
to fair and impartial treatment in our criminal justice system.”
299
 Fair and 
impartial treatment is hard to oppose, yet the encroachment upon terms 
reserved by constitutional doctrine to the rights of defendants is 
troubling.
300
 Indeed, despite the existence of the Constitution, the Oregon 
bill went on to “reject the notion that a criminal defendant’s rights must be 
superior to all others.”
301
 
On the issue of role, asymmetry often goes unnoticed, with defense and 
prosecution viewed instead as mirror images, duking it out in a zero-sum 
game,
302
 with maximum liberty the goal for one, and maximum 
imprisonment (otherwise known as “justice”) the goal for the other. One 
represents a client; the other is seen as representing a “victim,”
303
 for 
whom the smaller the constraint on the defendant’s liberty the greater the 
loss. Under this view, the two sides resemble private parties to a civil suit; 
the “minister of justice” has abdicated her position.
304
 Under this view, one 
hears nothing about the fact that prosecutorial “justice” may equate to 
something other than imprisonment, or that imprisonment may indeed 
leave the complainant’s needs unaddressed.
305
 
One sees an example of both role asymmetries and rights asymmetries 
being overlooked in what has been described as “the ‘Cocktail Party 
 
 
 297. See id. (“[The new legislation] [p]rovides an equal number of jury strikes for both the 
defense and prosecution. The current system of unequal strikes gives more rights to the defendant than 
to the victim.”). 
 298. See OR. REV. STAT. § 147.410 (1987). 
 299. Id. 
 300. See Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 57 (1992) (“[P]eremptory challenges are not 
constitutionally protected fundamental rights; rather, they are but one state-created means to the 
constitutional end of an impartial jury and a fair trial.”) 
 301. See OR. REV. STAT. § 147.410 (1987). 
 302. Note the way in which even commentators critical of the workings of the peremptory 
challenge fail to critique on ethical grounds the notion that the prosecution uses it in order to create a 
jury that looks as favorably as possible on the government’s case. See supra notes 145–50 and 
accompanying text. 
 303. See Uviller, supra note 75, at 1070 (“[The prosecutor] has no client, no interest save the 
interest of justice.”); Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) (“The United States Attorney is 
the representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to 
govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all . . . .”). 
 304. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8 cmt. [1] (2014) (“A prosecutor has the 
responsibility of a minister of justice and not simply that of an advocate.”). 
 305. See Heather Strang & Lawrence W. Sherman, Repairing the Harm: Victims and Restorative 
Justice, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 15, 18 (“Many victims are, in fact, quite ‘lenient’ in their own views about 
sentencing. Large proportions of crime victims surveyed are willing to consider alternatives to 
imprisonment for their offenders if they can play a part in the way their case is handled.”). 
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Question’ asked of every criminal [defense] lawyer”
306
: “How could you 
represent someone who was guilty?” Prosecutors are supposed to screen 
their cases with an eye to which ones are viable.
307
 Criminal defense 
lawyers—or at least those representing clients who are indigent
308
—are 
not.
309
 Criminal defense lawyers fulfill a constitutional mandate,
310
 and 
their zealous advocacy is supposed to extend from the guilty to the 
innocent, and to encompass everyone in between. Yet still they must 
explain this basic precept.
311
 
In each of these three areas—erosion in asymmetry of rights, erosion in 
asymmetry of roles, and erosion in the public’s understanding of both—
vigilance is needed in order to ensure that foundational aspects of our 
criminal justice system, and the way in which it is understood, are not lost. 
Halting the trend toward symmetry in one area of the criminal justice 
system—the allocation of peremptory challenges—therefore offers 
benefits not only in the context of jury selection but also through exposing 
and reinforcing the notion that, in the criminal justice system more 
broadly, asymmetry may act not as a threat to, but as a protector of, 
fairness. 
CONCLUSION 
Equating symmetry with fairness has obvious appeal. In the criminal 
justice system, however, asymmetry is often a key component of 
 
 
 306. See Back Cover to HOW CAN YOU REPRESENT THOSE PEOPLE? (Abbe Smith & Monroe H. 
Freedman eds., 2013), available at palgrave.com/page/detail/?k=971137311948 (describing the book 
as “the first-ever collection of essays offering a response to the ‘Cocktail Party Question’”); Linda 
Meyer, Between Reason and Power: Experiencing Legal Truth, 67 U. CIN. L. REV. 727, 727 (1999) 
(“How can you lawyers defend the guilty?”). 
 307. See MONROE H. FREEDMAN, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS’ ETHICS 219 (1990) 
(“[C]onscientious prosecutors do not put the destructive engine of the criminal process into motion 
unless they are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused is guilty.”); MODEL RULES OF 
PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8(a) (“The prosecutor in a criminal case shall refrain from prosecuting a charge 
that the prosecutor knows is not supported by probable cause . . . .”). 
 308. At least eighty to eighty-five percent of all criminal defendants are indigent. Barbara Mantel, 
Public Defenders: Do Indigent Defendants Get Adequate Legal Representation?, 18 CONG. Q. 
RESEARCHER 337, 339 (2008). 
 309. See Jesse Wegman, The Senate’s Hierarchy of Victimhood, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 5, 2014), 
http://takingnote.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/03/05/the-senates-hierarchy-of-victimhood/?hp&rref= opinion 
(saying of the Senate’s refusal to confirm Debo Adegbile as head of the Justice Department’s Civil 
Rights Division, because of his earlier representation of Mumia Abu-Jamal, “Some have called Mr. 
Adegbile a ‘cop-killer advocate.’ Another word for that might be ‘lawyer.’”). 
 310. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 311. See HOW CAN YOU REPRESENT THOSE PEOPLE?, supra note 306 (describing itself as “the 
first-ever collection of essays offering a response to the ‘Cocktail Party Question’ asked of every 
criminal lawyer”). 
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structures designed to protect fairness. Given the differing roles, resources, 
and responsibilities of prosecution and defense, across-the-board abolition 
of peremptory challenges would be far from fair. Yet legislative trends, 
and the legislative record, reveal that the fact that asymmetry can protect 
fairness has been obscured in the peremptory challenge context. The 
concept of asymmetry, and legislation that embodies it, need to be 
reinforced, not only so that an unhelpful trend within the peremptory 
challenge context can be reversed, but also so that broader trends toward 
symmetry within the criminal justice system can be uncovered, analyzed, 
and, where appropriate, resisted. 
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